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Black, White, Brown, Green, and Fordice:
The Flavor of Higher Education in
Louisiana and Mississippi
ALFREDA

A. SELLERS DIAMOND 1

I. Introduction
The question of race and its place in American life can appear in
the most unpredictable and the most predictable places. We could
not have predicted our encounter with the ire and laughter raised in
the midst of the Martin Luther King Day 2006 comments of New
Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin. Mayor Nagin spoke of the will of God in
2
the creation and recreation of New Orleans as a "chocolate city,"
meaning a city populated mostly by African Americans, in the wake
of the worst natural disaster in modern American history Hurricane Katrina. 3 Nor could we have predicted that national and
1. Revius 0. Ortique Professor of Law, Southern University Law Center, LL.M.
Columbia University; J.D., Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. I
would like to thank Professor Raymond T. Diamond for his helpful insights. I gratefully
acknowledge the substantial research assistance of Tamesha Bendaw.
2. Jarvis DeBerry, Mayor Steps in It, Totally Deep, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 20, 2006,
at 7; John Pope, Evoking King, Nagin Calls N.O. "Chocolate" City: Speech Addresses Fear of
Losing Black Culture, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 17, 2006, at 1. The King Day Celebration on
Monday, January 16, 2006, will long be remembered for Mayor Ray Nagin's prediction
that a fully restored New Orleans "will be chocolate at the end of the day." The context
of the chocolate he refers to originates from the funk group Parliament's 1975 album
entitled "Chocolate City." George Clinton wrote the title track: "There's a lot of
chocolate cities around. We've got Newark, we've got Gary. Somebody told me we got
L.A. And we're working on Atlanta. But you're the capital C.C." PARLIAMENT,
Chocolate City, on CHOCOLATE CITY (Casablanca Records 1975). The song is about
Washington, D.C., which has a majority African-American population. However,
Clinton's lyrics suggest that the general existence of "chocolate cities" may be a deserved
piece "of the rock" for African Americans because they are proxies for the promised "40
acres and a mule" that failed to materialize as post-Civil War reparations for slavery.
3. See Felicia R. Lee, After the Flood, the Reckoning, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2006, at El
(commenting on Spike Lee's portrayal of the despair Hurricane Katrina left upon New
Orleans); see also Gary Rivlin, Patchy Recovery in New Orleans; Some People Return, but
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international news broadcasts would display the immediate postKatrina pictures of the city of New Orleans, peppered with scenes of
the horror of those who did not immediately escape the storm.
While the storm devastated people from all stripes of life, the face of
the tragedy indelibly etched in the minds of millions was indeed a
Louisiana bittersweet chocolate picture. 4 Those who left the city of
New Orleans, those who were left behind, and those who died were
largely African American and poor.5
With the massive exodus of thousands from the city of New
Orleans, we could have predicted the rise of questions of race and
its intersection with the social, political, economic and educational
future of the city and state. 6 The dominance of race as a variable in
any discussion of Katrina is an irresistible force. The hurricane
constructed a vivid mosaic of the "racial dimension of class" in
America. 7 Most whose homes were destroyed lived in residential
communities still segregated by factors of race and class. 8 Media
outlets have shown thousands of images of New Orleans' Ninth
Ward as the proxy for what it means to have been poor, AfricanAmerican, and to have suffered the ultimate loss of home and
family at the hands of the storm. 9 The storm presented an
opportunity to observe the salience of the topic of race in twentyfirst century America. Most importantly, Katrina exposed the fact
Only One in 10 Businesses Has Reopened, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2006, at C1 (discussing the
difficulties small businesses face in Katrina's wake).
4. See, e.g., JOHN R. LOGAN, THE IMPACT OF KATRINA: RACE AND CLASS IN STORMDAMAGED NEIGHBORHOODS 1-12 (2006), http://www.s4.brown.edu/Katrina/ report.
pdf.
5. See William P. Quigley, Obstacle to Opportunity: Housing That Working And Poor
People Can Afford in New Orleans Since Katrina, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393 (Summer
2007) (stating that "tens of thousands of people who were left behind when Katrina hit,
mostly poor renters, were first bussed out to shelters. From shelters, hundreds of
thousands of people were moved into temporary housing in trailers, apartments, or
hotels".); LOGAN, supra note 4.
6. See Michelle R. Smith, Study: New Orleans Could Lose 80 Percent of Black Population,
BOSTON.COM, Jan. 26, 2006, http://www.boston.com (search for "New Orleans Could Lose
80 Percent of Black Population"; then follow "Results" hyperlink) (discussing Hurricane
Katrina's disproportionate effect on African Americans).
7. john a. powell, The Race and Class Nexus: An Intersectional Perspective, 25 LAW &
INEQ. 355, 360 (Summer 2007) (stating that although the terms "race" and "class"
comprise a continuing discourse in America, we do not fully understand the impact of
class on the discussion); see William P. Quigley, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Katrina:
Human and Civil Rights Left Behind Again, 81 TUL. L. REV. 955, 1000 (March 2007) (stating
that Katrina provided a lens through which to view the already intertwined inequalities
of race, gender, and poverty).
8. See Maya Wiley & john a. powell, Tearing Down Structural Racism and Rebuilding
Communities, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. OF POVERTY L. & POL'Y 68, 77 (May-June 2006).
9. See URBAN INST., KATRINA: DEMOGRAPHICS OF A DISASTER (2005), http://www.
urban.org/ UploadedPDF/900835_katrina-factsheet.pdf; see also Smith, supra note 6.
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that whites and blacks continue to live in separate experiential
spheres, despite the erasure of state requirements of segregation.
At the time of Hurricane Katrina, it had not been quite a year
since the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Ayers v.
Thompson, the Mississippi higher education desegregation case. 10
Additionally, the Settlement Agreement in United States v.
Louisiana," the state's higher education desegregation lawsuit,
expired in the wake of Katrina's wrath. The expiration of the
Louisiana Settlement Agreement slipped by quietly and was lost in
the vortex of the tornadic financial crisis that Katrina caused. The
impact of the Settlement Agreement's expiration and the pending
dismissal of United States v. Louisiana from federal court oversight
raise questions respecting the future flavor of higher education in
the state, but not so brazenly as Mayor Nagin's bizarre comments.
Although the questions come sub voce, they are present and
predictable. This Article seeks to raise and perhaps answer some of
Specifically, the end of the
those predictable questions.
desegregation cases in Mississippi and Louisiana, like the picture
drawn by Katrina, offer a window from which to view the
continuing implications regarding race and its impact on remedying
racial separation when the scars of de jure separation have not
healed.
This Article lays the foundation for these questions by
chronicling the post-Brown v. Board of Education12 struggles of two
states, Mississippi and Louisiana, to develop constitutionally
mandated equal educational services in their respective higher
education systems. The Article specifically compares the histories of
the higher education desegregation lawsuits in the states of
Mississippi and Louisiana as they traversed decades of litigation,
and compares the experiences and progress of these states under
their respective settlement agreements. The State of Mississippi is
no longer under federal court oversight; at the time of this Article's
publication, the State of Louisiana may have been released from
federal court oversight as well. The populations of the many
universities in both states are still largely identifiable as "chocolate"
or "vanilla," still racially identifiable as African American or
10. 543 U.S. 951 (2004). At the Supreme Court level the case was entitled United
States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992). The Mississippi higher education case had a long
life through a succession of Governors, reflected in the changes of party name:
Governors William Allain (1984-1988); Ray Mabus (1988-1992); Daniel Kirkwood (Kirk)
Fordice (1992-2000); Ronnie Musgrove (2000-2004); Haley Barbour (2004-present). 20042008 Miss. Reg. 67.
11. 9 F.3d 1159 (5th Cir. 1993).
12. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that the United States Constitution prohibits
racial segregation in schools).
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white. 13 In 1992, the United States Supreme Court case of United
States v. Fordice articulated the constitutional analysis to determine a
higher education system's compliance with the Fourteenth
Amendment. Therefore, this Article will consider and evaluate the
implementation of United States v. Fordice in both states. In its
evaluation of the implementation of Fordice,this Article assesses the
value of the "integrative ideal" which sought to convert "chocolate
14
schools" and "vanilla schools" to just schools.

II. The Creation of the Perfect Constitutional Storm
A. Widespread De lure Segregation in Education
The idea of a free and public school education was a new
concept for the states of the nation during the first half of the
nineteenth century. 15 Prior to the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it was largely expected that any education the states
16
chose to provide African Americans would be in separate facilities.
The immediate post-Civil War period witnessed the growth and
availability of public schools, largely to the exclusion of AfricanAmerican children. 17 As a local matter, education was within the
purview of state authority. 18 However, the Fourteenth Amendment
became a proxy for the threat of federal interference in all state
13. See infra Part VI.
14. See Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent, 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968) (paraphrasing

Justice Brennan's instructions to New Kent County School Board to construct a
desegregation plan that would "convert promptly to a system without a 'white' school
and a 'Negro' school, but just schools").
15. See JAMES D. ANDERSON, THE EDUCATION OF BLACKS IN THE SOUTH, 1860-1935, at

2 (UNC Press 1988) (noting that not until the nineteenth century's end were "the
organization, scope, and role of schooling ... transformed into a carefully articulated
structure of free tax-supported public institutions"); see also HARRY GEHMAN GOOD &
JAMES D. TELLER, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 132-35 (1973) (discussing a "new

principle" of "free education for all in public, common schools"); LEON LITWACK,
Education:Separate and Unequal, in EDUCATION IN AMERICAN HISTORY, READINGS ON THE

SOCIAL ISSUES 253, 253-66 (Michael B. Katz ed., Praeger 1973) (highlighting the North's
outraged reaction, and subsequent protesting, to the notion of equal opportunity for all
students in early nineteenth century).
16. LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO AND THE FREE STATES, 17901860, at 113-14 (University of Chicago Press 1961) (noting the "possibility that Negro
children would be mixed with white children in the same classroom aroused even
greater fears and prejudices than those which consigned the Negro to an inferior place in
the church, the theater, and the railroad car. This indeed constituted virtual
amalgamation").
17. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at 2.
18. Id.
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prerogatives which had previously supported regimes of
separateness. 19 In response to the threat, states attempted to assert
their right to maintain the pre-Civil War status quo by enacting
positive law on the topic. 20 Moreover, to those that were part of the
Confederate movement for secession, the Fourteenth Amendment
represented both the stick and the carrot. It was the carrot in that it
represented an opportunity to rejoin the nation on equal footing. It
was also the stick in that a state's congressional representation
would only be recognized upon its ratification of the Fourteenth
21
Amendment.
And yet, the states' rich and systemized sets of Black Codes and
Jim Crow laws were fortified by the United States Supreme Court's
introduction of the new equality, which would dominate the
twentieth century. 22 With the Supreme Court's imprimatur of
separate as the constitutional measure of equality in Plessy v.
Ferguson,23 a firm constitutional basis for the development and
maintenance of inferior school services for African Americans was
inevitable.24 The schoolhouse became the site of more regimented
19. See, e.g., Report of the Senate Committee on Federal Relations, 1866 TEx. S.J. 422-23
(expressing opposition to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments and
characterizing the amendments as "unnecessary and dangerous to the future peace of
the Republic;... [altering] the form and fashion of our Government;... [centralizing] all
power in the Federal Congress, making the States mere appendages to a vast oligarchy,
at the National Capitol;... [involving] the loss of our honor as a people, and our selfrespect as individual men").
20. See WILLIAM COHEN, AT FREEDOM'S EDGE: BLACK MOBILITY AND THE SOUTHERN
WHITE QUEST FOR RACIAL CONTROL 1861-1915, at 216-17 (1991) (discussing laws passed
by various states, including Mississippi, South Carolina, Alabama, Louisiana, and
Florida, regarding miscegenation, school segregation, transportation, and public
accommodations).
21. 14 Stat. 428 (1867); 15 Stat. 2 (1867); 15 Stat. 14 (1867); 15 Stat. 25 ("Reconstruction
Acts" of 1867 which declared state constitutions of former secessionist states to be in
violation of United States Constitution, separated them into districts governed under
military authority and martial law, required them to conduct new constitutional
conventions which protected rights of African Americans to vote, and required rebel
states to ratify Fourteenth Amendment in order to be readmitted to Union).
22. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 22-29 (Oxford
University Press 1974).
23. 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896).
24. Although Plessy does not use the term explicitly, the case is often cited as
announcing the "separate but equal" doctrine. Under the Plessy court's construction of
the Fourteenth Amendment, states could require blacks and whites to attend separate
universities as long as the educational services were "substantially equal."
The
"substantially equal" part of Plessy separation was never actualized.
Plessy-age
historically black colleges and universities suffered from a host of problems related to
chronic disparities in funding. For example, Hemann Marion Sweatt was denied
admission to the University of Texas Law School under a state law that required racial
separation in schools. The Supreme Court found that the separate school for African
Americans was not substantially equal to the University of Texas School of Law and
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laws governing the separation of the races. 25 Over one third of
states share this common history of de jure segregation in
elementary, secondary, and higher education. 26 Both Louisiana 27
and Mississippi 28 had laws establishing segregation in education.
The constitutional doctrine of separate but equal was not
reversed until the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board
of Education (Brown I).29 However, despite the Fourteenth
Amendment's command of equality, years of Jim Crow governance
of public schools created a perfect constitutional storm whose effects
would not readily be reversed. Today, fifty-three years after Brown,
the Office of Civil Rights for the United States Department of
Education is still involved in the oversight of desegregation efforts
in Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Texas, Ohio, and
Virginia. 30 Additionally, the court-ordered higher education decrees
of three states have recently expired. The Alabama Settlement
Agreement expired on July 31, 2005. 31 The Louisiana Settlement
Agreement expired on December 31, 2005.32 Tennessee's Consent
Decree expired on January 4, 2006. 33 Also, on March 29, 2001,
Mississippi entered a settlement of its long-running desegregation

Sweatt was ordered admitted. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629, 634-636 (1950). Similarly,
G. W. McLaurin was admitted to the University of Oklahoma for graduate school under
a newly revised law allowing the admission of African Americans to historically white
schools when there were no separate historically black schools. Upon his admission,
McLaurin was required to sit in a separate classroom, use a separate desk in the library;
and eat at a separate time in the cafeteria. The Supreme Court found these practices
violated the Equal Protection Clause. McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U. S. 637, 640-642
(1950).
25. WOODWARD, supra note 22, at 24 (describing public schools as the "most
conspicuous" aspect of segregation).
26. Id. at 10.
27. See LA. CONST. of 1898, art. 248; LA. CONST. of 1879, arts. 224, 231; LA. CONST. of
1868, art. 135; LA. CONST. of 1852, art. 136.
28. See MISS. CONST. of 1890, art. VIII; 1880 Miss. Laws 776.
29. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). Brown involved the consolidation of four desegregation
cases from Kansas, South Carolina, Delaware and Virginia. The United States Supreme
Court determined that if states chose to provide elementary and secondary public school
education to their citizens, the states were required to do so equally without regard to
race. The court declared the provision of educational services in a racially segregated
environment "inherently unequal." Id.
30. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
31. United States v. Alabama, 900 F. Supp. 272, 374 (N.D. Ala. 1995).
32. Tenth Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement,
Implementation of the Settlement Agreement at i, United States v. State of Louisiana,
No. 80-3300A (Oct. 2005) [hereinafter Tenth Annual Evaluation].
33. See Geier v. Sundquist, 128 F.Supp 2d 519, 547 (M.D.Tenn. 2001) (stating that the
court "shall retain jurisdiction of this case for a period of five years or for a period of
time sufficient to insure compliance with the Agreement's terms").
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lawsuit. 34 It is disheartening that more than one hundred years after
Plessy v. Ferguson, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the
country continued to witness four states in ongoing federal court
desegregation litigation and seven others in desegregation
partnership agreements, struggling with the seemingly intractable
problem of race and equality of educational opportunity. 35
B. Delay and Deliberation: Resistance to Desegregation Creates
Decades of Constitutional Turmoil
Brown v. Board of Education carried the promise and opportunity
to improve the status of the historically black college. Although the
Court held that separate educational systems based on race were
unconstitutional respecting segregated elementary and secondary
schools, the case was immediately thought to apply in the higher
education context. 36 States interpreted the Brown v. Board of
Education II Court's time-line for desegregation of "all deliberate
speed," 37 as permitting delay, thus setting in motion fifty-plus years
of constitutional struggle in converting dual educational systems
into unitary ones.
After it was clear that state laws could no longer require
exclusion of African Americans from white institutions of higher
learning, some states employed clever but surreptitious methods to
block the admission of black students into previously segregated
universities. For example, Louisiana statutory law required Arnease
Ludley to obtain a certificate of good character from her high school

34. Settlement Agreement, Ayers v. Musgrove, No. 4:75CV9-B-D (N. D. Miss. Mar.
29, 2001) [hereinafter Mississippi Settlement Agreement].
35. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
36. State of Floridaex rel. Virgil D. Hawkins came before the Court on May 24, 1954,
exactly one week after the Brown decision. 347 U. S. 971 (1954). Hawkins was denied

admission to the University of Florida School of Law. The Court remanded the case to
the Florida Supreme Court for consideration in light of the Brown I decision. Upon
remand, the Florida Supreme Court allowed the university an unspecified amount of

time to consider and implement the changes necessary to accommodate an AfricanAmerican student. State ex rel. Virgil D. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control, 83 So. 2d 20, 25 (Fla.
1955) (noting Brown II's imprecise time line for the implementation of desegregation

respecting Hawkins' case (citing Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955))).
Subsequently, the Court vacated this order and entered a new order relying on Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629; Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1947); and
McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950). Fla. ex rel. Hawkins
v. Bd. Of Control of Fla., 350 U.S. 413 (1956). Hawkins was "entitled to prompt
admission under the rules and regulations applicable to other qualified candidates." Id.
at 414.

37. 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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principal for admission to Louisiana State University. 38 However,
Ludley was unable to obtain the certificate because the same statute
required the principal's dismissal for "performing any act toward
bringing about integration of the races" in schools. 39 Autherine
Lucy and Polly Ann Myers were summoned to the office of the
Dean of Admissions at the University of Alabama where their
40
applications for admission were personally returned to them.
They were told that the course work that interested them could be
found at Alabama State College, the state's historically black
institution. 41 Myra Dinsmore's application for admission to the
Georgia State College of Business Administration was returned for
being incomplete because she did not attach the required certificates
of good character furnished by alumni of the institution. 42
James Meredith's application to the University of Mississippi
was also judged defective because he did not furnish
recommendations from alumni attesting to the fitness of his moral
character. 43
Additionally, the Registrar of the University of
Mississippi alleged that he denied the application because he was
concerned that Meredith was not seeking admission to the
University in good faith, and that Meredith's fear that his
application might be denied because of his race "shocked, surprised
and disappointed" the Registrar. 44 The Registrar also claimed that
Meredith's request for admission was so "rash" and "unjustified"
that it raised grave questions as to Meredith's "ability to conduct
himself as a normal person" and "as a harmonious student on the
campus of the University of Mississippi." 45 The Fifth Circuit's
determination that Meredith was excluded "solely because he was a
Negro," and the court's grant of Meredith's request for injunctive
relief, signaled that Brown I could not be countermanded by "Fabian
polic[ies] of worrying the enemy into defeat while time worked for

38. Ludley v. Bd. of Supervisors of L.S.U., 150 F. Supp. 900, 902 (E.D. La. 1957).
39. Id. at 902-03. The court noted that Lousiana's statutes were unconstitutional
because they were intended to discriminate and circumvent the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Id.
40. Lucy v. Adams, 134 F. Supp. 235, 237 (N.D. Ala. 1955).
41. Id. at 239. The federal court enjoined the Dean of Admissions from denying
Lucy, Myers and all others similarly situated, from enrolling in the University of
Alabama based on race. Id.
42. Hunt v. Arnold, 172 F. Supp. 847, 854 (N.D. Ga. 1959). Because all alumni of the
institution prior to the plaintiffs' applications were white, the certificates would not have
been forthcoming. As only white alumi could provide certification, the federal court
held that the certificate requirement violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 857.
43. Meredith v. Fair, 305 F.2d 343, 348 (5th Cir. 1962).
44. Id. at 350.
45. Id.
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the defenders." 46 The ebb of the first wave of post-Brown I higher
education equal opportunity cases was now ushering in the second
wave: the higher education desegregation lawsuits.
The higher education desegregation lawsuits have been fought
on two federal fronts. On one front, plaintiffs sought to compel the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") to enforce
the requirements of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On
another front, private plaintiffs and the United States Department of
Justice filed suits seeking to dismantle prior systems of segregated
higher education. The case of Adams v. Richardson followed the
HEW's informal attempts to work with state governments to
desegregate their prior de jure systems of higher education. 47 In
January of 1969, the HEW found that ten states were operating dual
systems of education based on race. 48 Subsequently, HEW informed
Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, North Carolina, Florida,
Arkansas, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Maryland, and Virginia that their
dual systems of education rendered them in violation of Title VI,
placing them in danger of losing vital federal funds. 49 Each state
was invited to submit a desegregation plan within 120 days.
Arkansas, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Maryland, and Virginia submitted
plans that HEW determined to be inadequate for dismantling the de
jure systems of segregation in the states. Florida, North Carolina,
Mississippi, Louisiana, and Oklahoma never submitted plans. 50
HEW did not aggressively seek enforcement of Title VI after

46. Id. at 361. Amidst 400 United States deputy marshals and 1,000 federal troops,
James Meredith finally enrolled at University of Mississippi on October 1, 1962. See Al
Kuettner, Ole Miss Enrolls Meredith After Riots Kill 2, Injure 75, UNITED PRESS
INTERNATIONAL, Oct. 1, 1962. Judge John Minor Wisdom wrote the opinion in Meredith
v. Fair. His characterization of Mississippi's delay tactics referenced the military strategy
of the Roman General, Fabius. General Fabius was known for "ke[eping] his army
always near Hannibal's but never attack[ing], harassing Hannibal continually, but never
joining battle." THE NEW COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 916 (William H. Harris & Judith S.
Levey, eds., Columbia U. Press 1975).
47. Adams v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 636 (D. D.C. 1972). Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color,
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Each agency has been given the power by Congress to
make rules to accomplish the statutory goal of non-discrimination. Each agency is also
given the power to seek compliance with Title VI by refusing to advance further federal
funding after notice and an opportunity to be heard. See generally id. This statute seeks
to foster voluntary compliance ahead of coercive action. Pursuant to the statute,
Congress must be notified prior to the time an agency seeks to withhold funding. Id. at
§ 2000d-5.
48. Adams, 351 F. Supp. at 637-38.
49. Id. at 638.
50. Id.
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making its determinations of non-compliance. 51 In response to
HEW's lack of diligence in enforcing the requirements of Title VI,
Kenneth Adams and other named plaintiffs filed suit against the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Director of the
Office of Civil Rights, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to
mandate the agency to perform its statutory duty.5 2 The district
court granted the relief the plaintiffs sought. Judge John Pratt found
that once a recipient of federal educational funds was found in
violation of Title VI's non-discrimination requirements and had
failed to voluntarily correct non-compliance, the Office of Civil
Rights had no discretion to allow a recipient to continue receiving
further federal funding.5 3 Additionally, Judge Pratt determined that
HEW was statutorily bound to enforce the requirements of Title
VI.54

The Adams litigation ultimately ended in 1990 with the
determination by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
that Title VI did not provide a private right of action for HEW's
failure to enforce its statutory provisions.5 5 Judge Ruth Bader
Ginsburg determined that "the generalized action [that] plaintiffs
[sought to] pursue against federal executive agencies lack[ed] the
requisite green light from the legislative branch."5 6 Although the
Adams litigation ended unsatisfactorily, Title VI enforcement by the
Department of Education continued into the 1990s and the twentyfirst century. After the United States Supreme Court decided
Fordice, the Office of Civil Rights gave notice that it would conduct a
Fordice compliance review of the states whose desegregation plans
51. Id.
52. Id. at 637.
53. Id. at 641-42. See also Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92, 94 (D. D.C. 1973)

("Having once determined that a state system of higher education is in violation of Title
VI, and having failed during a substantial period of time to achieve voluntary
compliance, [HEW] has a duty to commence enforcement proceedings."). The court
ordered enforcement proceedings to begin against Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma,
North Carolina, Florida, Arkansas, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Maryland and Virginia
within 120 days. Id.
54. Adams, 351 F. Supp. at 640 ("HEW and all other federal agencies empowered to
grant federal assistance to any program or activity are directed by § 2000d-1 of Title VI
to effectuate the provisions of § 2000d.").
55. See Women's Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(concluding plaintiffs lacked claim against Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare because they had alternative remedies for their injuries).
56. Id. at 752. The Court determined that nothing in Council of the Blind of Del. Cty.
Valley v. Regan, 709 F. 2d 1521, 1530, 1531 n.69, (D.C. Cir. 1982), Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d
161 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 465 U. S. 1021 (1984), or Adams v. Bell, 711
F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1983) evinced that Congress intended to create an implied right of
action to pursue a Title VI claim against a federal executive agency. Women's Equity
Action League, 906 F.2d at 747.
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had expired. 57 As a result of the review, the Office of Civil Rights
entered cooperative desegregation partnership agreements with
Florida, Texas, Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and
Virginia, resulting in Fordice compliant desegregation plans.58 As of
fiscal year 2005, the Office of Civil Rights was still monitoring the
59
desegregation efforts of these states.
On the second federal lawsuit front, the United States
Department of Justice filed suit in Alabama, Mississippi, and
Louisiana seeking to dismantle the prior de jure systems of higher
education, and private plaintiffs also brought lawsuits seeking to
secure better funding for historically black colleges and
universities. 60 Because of their aegis in Plessy, many of these
57. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, Notice of Application of Supreme
Court Decision, Jan. 28, 1994, available at http://www.ed.gov (search "Notice of
Application of Supreme Court decision"; then follow hyperlink).
58. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Annual Report to Congress, Higher

Education Desegregation, FY 2000; U.S. DEPT OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Annual
Report to Congress, Higher Education Agreements, FY 2001-2004, available at
http://www.ed.gov (search "annual reports to congress"; then follow "OCR's Annual
Reports to Congress" hyperlink; then select year); Maryland Higher Education
Commission, OCR Agreement, Maryland's Report and The PartnershipAgreement Between
The State of Maryland and the U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, available
at http://www.mhec.state.md.us/higherEd/ocrplan.
See also, Letter of Kevin M.
O'Keefe, Chairman, Maryland Higher Education Commission to Wendella P. Fox,
Director, Philadelphia Office of Civil Rights, United States Department of Education
detailing full compliance with Desegregation Partnership Agreement (June 19, 2006); but
see also Coalition for Equity and Excellence In Maryland Higher Education vs. Robert
Ehrlich, Jr., No 24-C-06-0081370G, (Cir. Ct. for Baltimore City Md. filed Oct. 13, 2006)
(alleging that the state of Maryland is currently maintaining a dual system of higher
education in contravention of Fordice). The case was removed to the federal court on
October 23, 2006, and an order was signed on January 20, 2007, administratively closing
the case. Notice of Removal, Coalition for Equity and Excellence in Md. v. Robert L.
Ehrlich, Jr., No. MJG-0602773, (U.S. D.C. Dist. Md. Oct. 23, 2006); Order Staying and
Administratively Closing Case, Coalition for Equity and Excellence in Md. v. Robert L.
Ehrlich, Jr. No. MJG-0602773, (U.S. D.C. Dist. Md. Oct. 23, 2006).
59. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Annual Report to Congress, Higher

Education Agreements, FY 2005, available at http://www.ed.gov (search "annual reports to
congress"; then follow "OCR's Annual Reports to Congress" hyperlink; then select
"2005").
60. See United States v. Alabama, 14 F.3d 1534 (11th Cir. 1994), remanded to 900 F.
Supp. 272 (N.D. Ala. 1995). The United States brought an action against the Alabama
higher education system and private plaintiffs intervened. Id. See Ayers v. Allain, 914
F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1990); Sanders v. Ellington, 288 F. Supp. 937, 939 (M.D. Tenn. 1968);
supra Part IV.B.; see also United States v. Louisiana, 527 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. La. 1981); supra
Part IV A. Sanders v. Ellington was brought in 1968 in the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Tennessee in order to prevent the University of Tennessee from
building a new facility for expansion of its educational program. 288 F.Supp. at 939.
The United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare intervened seeking an
order to command the state defendants to submit a plan for desegregating its system of
higher education. Id.
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historically black colleges and universities have always had
problems securing resource parity with other public institutions
within the same state. To these schools, the Brown I mandate of
equal educational opportunity irrespective of race represented the
guarantee of a remedy that would correct years of disparate
funding, thereby elevating their status and improving their ability to
achieve the goal of equality. Historically black colleges and
universities were poised for a change after Brown I, but part of that
change was unexpected. The institutions that served them well in
the world of Plessy might actually cease to exist under the same
Brown I mandate of equal educational opportunity. 61 A most salient
question after the Adams litigation, as well as after the higher
education lawsuits in Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and
Tennessee, 62 is how and under what circumstances historically black
colleges could continue to exist. Each case is representative of the
difficulty the federal court has had in fashioning a principled
standard by which the Brown mandate could be measured and
enforced in the higher education context.
The desegregation sagas in Louisiana and Mississippi are two
of the longest running and most recently settled higher education
desegregation cases. More importantly, they are representative of
the problem with the Brown II remedy of dismantlement with "all
deliberate speed." 63 The Brown II remedy became a proxy for delay
and entrenchment, resulting in the accentuation of problems created
by Plessy educational regimes. The higher education litigation in
Louisiana and Mississippi demonstrate the rocky path each system
traversed while their respective federal district courts struggled to
establish a principled standard for constitutional compliance. In
each of these cases the federal court had to decide whether raceneutral admissions practices were sufficient or whether the United
States Constitution required more affirmative actions to satisfy the
Brown I mandate of equal educational opportunity.

61. See infra Part IV.E.
62. See infra notes 144-47.
63. Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U. S. 294, 300-01 (1955).
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III. Development of the Two Cases
A. The Mississippi Case: Ayers v. Allain
The state of Mississippi is home to eight public four-year
colleges. Alcorn State University, Jackson State University, and
Mississippi Valley State University are the state's historically black
colleges. 64 The remaining four-year institutions, University of
Mississippi, Mississippi State University, Mississippi University for
Women University of Southern Mississippi, and Delta State
University, are historically white universities. 65 Prior to Brown I, the
state of Mississippi required segregation in higher education
pursuant to state constitutional and statutory law. 66 Those holding
the political reigns in the state did not welcome Brown J.67 The
Court's decision in Brown I came during the same year as the
Mississippi higher education system's Brewton Report, a selfexamination of the status of higher education in the state. 68 The
report revealed disparities in facilities, deficits in funding, and
weaknesses in programmatic offerings at the historically black
64. Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1523, 1527-29 (N.D. Miss. 1987). Alcorn State
University was originally established in 1871 as a trade-school-like-college for AfricanAmerican males. It is located in Alcorn, Mississippi. Id. Mississippi Valley State
University was established in 1946 by Act of the Mississippi state legislature as a
vocational school for African American students. Id. It is located in Itta Bena,
Mississippi. Id. Jackson State University was established in 1946 to train AfricanAmerican teachers. It is located in Jackson, Mississippi. Id.
65. Id. All of the State of Mississippi's historically white four-year universities were
mandated under law to be Plessy institutions. Id. The University of Mississippi was
established in 1844 and opened in 1854. Id. Mississippi State University was established
in 1878, opened in 1880 and is located near Starkville, Mississippi. Id. at 1527. The
Mississippi University for Women was established to educate white women in 1884 and
it is located in Columbus, Mississippi. Id. The University of Southern Mississippi was
established in 1910, opened in 1912 and is located in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. Id. at
1527-28. Delta State University was established in 1924, opened in 1924 and is located in
Cleveland, Mississippi. Id. at 1528.
66. See MISS. CONST.; 1880 Miss. Laws, supra note 28.
67. See John N. Popham, Reaction of South: 'Breathing Spell' for Adjustment Tempers
Region's Feelings, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1954, at 1 (highlighting that Governor Hugh
Lawson White reportedly urged a "go slow" approach and stating he said that "he
would move for an early meeting of the Mississippi Legal Education Advisory
Committee [to study] methods to maintain school segregation if the [Supreme Court]
outlawed it."); William S. White, Ruling to Figure in '54 Campaign: Decision Tied to
Eisenhower-Russell Leads Southerners in Criticism of Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1954 at 1
(quoting Senator James 0. Eastland of Mississippi as saying: "The South will not abide
by nor obey this legislative decision by a political court.").
68. See Brief of Petitioners at 14, Ayers v. Mabus, No. 90-65-6588 (5th Cir. 1991)
(citing Brewton, Higher Education in Mississippi (1954)) (describing equal educational
opportunity goal as being "still very distant").
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institutions. 69 Despite this knowledge, the State of Mississippi
continued to engage in practices intended to thwart the entry of
70
African-Americans into its historically white universities.
While the Title VI litigation instituted by HEW against
Mississippi and other states was pending in the federal courts, Jake
Ayers and other black citizens of the state of Mississippi filed suit in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Mississippi alleging that the state of Mississippi was maintaining a
dual system of higher education based on race.71 The suit was filed
on January 28, 1975, naming as defendants Governor William A.
Allain, the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher
Learning, the State Department of Education, and the State
Superintendent of Education. The United States intervened on April
21, 1975, alleging Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Title
VI violations. The United States claimed that state continued to
operate a dual system of higher education based on race after the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown I, in that the state's historically
black colleges and universities were subjected to disparate funding
and maintenance. 72 The defendants denied all Fourteenth
Amendment violations. The position of the defendants throughout
the litigation was that the existence of essentially one-race
institutions in the system of higher education was the result of the
free choice of individual students as opposed to any actions of the
state which perpetuated segregated institutions and that Brown I
73
required no further action by the State.
69. See Brief for The Alcorn State University National Alumni Association, as
Amicus Curiae Supporting

Petitioners, Ayers v. Mabus 505 U.S. 717 (1992) (No. 90-

1205). In support of their argument that the state of Mississippi was responsible for
current segregative effects, the alunmi of Alcorn University cited to the historical
funding practices of the state of Mississippi. Id. at 12. Expenditures for Alcorn from
1934-1943 were reported to have averaged $94,000 per funding year, whereas it was

$273,000 for Mississippi State University per funding year according to the Brewton
Report. Id. For funding year 1947-1952, $433,000 was appropriated for Alcorn whereas

1.9 million was appropriated for Mississippi State University according to the Brewton
Report. Id. The Alcorn State University Alumni Association cited the Brewton Report

which stated: "Educational opportunities for blacks were limited to undergraduate
training in teacher education, agriculture, mechanical arts, and the practical arts and
trades while white students enjoyed extensive offerings at the undergraduate, graduate
and professional levels." Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1523, 1528 n.2 (N.D. Miss. 1987).

70.
71.
72.
denied

See supra Part II.B.
Ayers, 674 F. Supp. at 1525.
Id. Plaintiffs claimed that both African-American faculty and students were
equal educational opportunities because of the disparities in the institutional

missions of the historically black colleges, the quality and quantity of academic
offerings, the quality of the academic personnel, the lack of land grant funding available

to the historically black colleges, and fiscal and facilities disparities. Id.
73. Id. at 1525-26. The state of Mississippi relied heavily on the argument that "good
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The case went to trial before Judge Neal Brooks Biggers, Jr. in
April of 1987. 74 After a trial that lasted five weeks, Judge Biggers
made findings of fact and conclusions of law as to admissions and
student enrollment, 75 student recruitment, 76 faculty recruitment, 77
institutional missions and academic programs, 78 funding to the
universities, 79 and facilities.80 After articulating the standard that
the state had an affirmative duty to disestablish its dual system of
higher education, Judge Biggers concluded that the state of
Mississippi had met that duty. 81 According to Judge Bigger's
faith non-discriminatory and non-racial admissions" implemented on a state-wide basis
indicated that the state had fulfilled any responsibilities it had respecting the provision
of equal educational opportunity. Id. The state maintained that its higher education
system was unitary and "untainted by discriminatory actions or purposes." Id.
74. Id. at 1523. Judge Neal Brooks Biggers, Jr. was appointed to the federal district
court for the Northern District of Mississippi in 1984 by President Ronald Reagan and he
presided over all trial phases of Ayers through its settlement in 2001. Federal Judicial
Center, Judges of the United States Courts, http://www.qc.gov/history/home.nsf.
75. Ayers, 674 F. Supp. at 1530-31, 1536-39, 1556 (determining that although the ACT
was not adopted as a criterion for entry in any university or college in the state until
after James Meredith sought admission to the University of Mississippi, the system's
current policies and practices were "reasonable, educationally sound, and racially
neutral").
76. Id. at 1558 (finding that student recruitment practices suggested that the system
was dedicated to encouraging "minority participation in the system").
77. Id. at 1537 (finding that there was a substantial presence of other-race faculty
members at the historically black colleges and universities but not at the historically
white colleges and universities). Judge Biggers attributed the lack of African-American
professors at the historically white universities to a shortage in the pool of qualified
individuals, as well as to the difficulties presented in retaining them. Id. He found that
the state of Mississippi met its constitutional duty to dismantle the prior de jure system
responsible for the current disparity in the presence of other-race faculty by adopting
race-neutral procedures for hiring. Id. at 1564.
78. Id. at 1538, 1561. The court evaluated whether the current mission assignments
of the historically white and the historically black colleges were tied to their prior de jure
status and whether that history unconstitutionally tainted their current status. The
historically white universities designated as "comprehensive" institutions were
earmarked for funding at a higher level under state law and the court found no intent to
discriminate. Id. at 1561. Judge Biggers also rejected the argument unnecessary
program duplication placed the historically black colleges and universities at a
disadvantage in attracting a white student population, stating that there was no
evidence that the elimination of program duplication would have any effect on a
student's choice. Id.
79. Id. at 1546-48 (concluding that differential funding was not intentionally
discriminatory, but was instead connected to institution's mission within system of
higher education).
80. Id. at 1548, 1561-62 (finding that although facilities at historically black
universities at one time had been disparately impacted by inequities in state funding,
improvements demonstrated by state between 1970 and 1986 suggested "good faith
affirmative effort on the part of the defendants to provide adequate facilities at the
historically black institutions in accordance with their defined mission").
81. Id. at 1564.
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findings, students were recruited and admitted to each of the state's
universities on a race-neutral basis, and faculty, staff, and fiscal
allocations were made on a race-neutral basis.8 2 Having established
that the higher education system was administered on a race-neutral
basis, Judge Biggers found no constitutional violations and the case
83
was dismissed.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that
the state of Mississippi had not met its burden to dismantle its dual
system of education. In an opinion written by Judge Irving L.
Goldberg,8 4 the court agreed that Judge Biggers had correctly
85
selected Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, Virginia
as the measure for determining whether the state met its burden for
dismantling the prior de jure segregation in education.8 6 However,
Judge Goldberg found that Judge Biggers' reading and application
of Green was incorrect.8 7 While Judge Biggers correctly recognized
that Green placed an "affirmative duty" on the states to dismantle
segregated systems of higher education, he failed to value the "root
and branch" element of Green which required the state to eliminate
Instead, Judge Biggers'
all vestiges of de jure segregation.88
interpretation of Green required only that the State of Mississippi
implement "good faith race neutral policies and procedures" in
89
order to meet its constitutional responsibility.
Judge Bigger's application of Green was based on the analysis of
Green in Alabama State Teachers Association (ASTA) v. Alabama Public
School and College Authority and Bazemore v. Friday.90 The Court of
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Judge Irving Loeb Goldberg was appointed to the Fifth Circuit in 1966 by

President Lyndon B. Johnson. He served on the Fifth Circuit until his death in 1995.
Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the United States Courts, http://www.fjc.gov/
history/home.nsf.
85. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, Va., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
86. Ayers v. Allain, 893 F. 2d 732,743 (5th Cir. 1990).

87. Id. at 743-44.
88. Id. at 750. The Fifth Circuit carefully explained how and why the rule of Green
had to be understood and interpreted in the context of the Brown I mandate of equal
educational opportunity and the Brown II remedy of desegregation: "Under Green the

creation of a unitary school system is the goal, a goal tantamount to the elimination of
the effects of de jure discrimination, root and branch. If a less demanding standard were
adopted, images of inferiority would be memorialized with the force of law, contrary to
the vision of Brown, because vestiges of discrimination would remain unaddressed.
Brown commands the application of Green in all of its fertility to the public university
forum." Id.
89. Id.
90. Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1523, 1552 (1987) rev'd, 893 F.2d 732. In ASTA the
plaintiffs challenged the decision of the State of Alabama to open a four-year branch
campus of Auburn University in the physical proximity of Alabama State University, a
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Appeals, however, held that the district court's application of Green
was erroneous and in turn adopted the interpretation of Green from
the Sixth Circuit's decision in Geier v. Alexander.91 Accordingly, the
Fifth Circuit evaluated the various admissions policies of the state
universities, 92 the composition of the university faculties, 93 the
missions and academic programs of the institutions, 94 and
funding, 95 and determined that the defendants had not met their
duty under Green. The state's use of race-neutral policies was not
enough to transform its dual systems of higher education into a
unitary system of higher education. 96 On remand, the district court
was instructed to take its guidance from the Fifth Circuit's
interpretation of Green hoping that "any sortie on remand will not
97
be long or bitterly fought.
A speedy resolution of the Ayers case was not to be. An en banc
vote of the Fifth Circuit 98 resulted in a rehearing of the case and a
historically black university. 289 F. Supp. 784, 785-86 (M.D. Ala. 1968). They argued
that the creation of the new branch of Auburn University would have perpetuated a
dual system of education by reducing the ability of the historically black college to
compete for students in the same geographic area. Id. The district court concluded that
"as long as the State and a particular institution are dealing with admissions, faculty and
staff in good faith, the basic requirement of the affirmative duty to dismantle the dual
school system on the college level, to the extent that the system may be based upon
racial considerations, is satisfied." Ayers, 674 F. Supp. at 1552 (citing ASTA, 289 F.Supp.
784,789 (M.D. Ala. 1968). In Bazemore, the United States Supreme Court reviewed an
attack on two North Carolina high school clubs which were segregated under law, but
which were presently composed of students admitted on a race-neutral basis. 478 U.S.
385, 388-91 (1986). The clubs were still largely identifiable by race. Id. at 391. The
United States Supreme Court determined that the Green duty to desegregate all vestiges
of prior de jure segregation in a compulsory education system was inapplicable to clubs
where memberships were voluntary. Id. at 409 (White, J., concurring).
91. Ayers, 893 F.2d at 744 (citing 801 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1986)).
92. Ayers, 893 F.2d at 735-36 (discussing admission policies from 1976-1986 and effect
of minimum ACT score as requirement for admissions).
93. Id. at 736-38 (discussing relative composition of faculties, by observing
percentages of races in level of education of professors, salaries, and number of
administrators at each university).
94. Id. at 738-39 (highlighting universities' institutional missions and academics).
95. Id. at 741-42 (outlining funding of universities and calculating differences in
average total education and general income per student and average total education and
general expenditures per student among universities).
96. Id. at 753. The Fifth Circuit concluded: "Vestiges of de jure segregation permeate
the public university system of Mississippi. Admissions policies, the racial composition
of the faculty and administration, funding practices, academic offerings, and mission
designations all perpetuate a stigma of inferiority. Contrary to the mandates of Brown
and Green, a unitary system has not been achieved." Id.
97. Id. at 756.
98. The coalition of judges writing for the majority and those writing for the
minority broke down across solidly partisan lines characterized by the Presidents who
appointed them. Judge John Duhe (1988-Reagan), who previously dissented in the
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subsequent affirmation of Judge Biggers' previous decision. 99 En
banc, the Fifth Circuit court agreed with the district court's original
reading of Green and determined that the state of Mississippi had
indeed satisfied its constitutional obligation under Brown I and
Green by "discontinuing prior discriminatory practices and adopting
and
policies
good-faith, race-neutral
implementing
and
procedures." 100 It was September 28, 1990, and the Mississippi case
was poised for the United States Supreme Court to grant it
certiorari.

opinion of the three judge court, wrote for a majority which determined that the Green
standard as interpreted by ASTA was correct. He was joined by Judges Thomas Gee
(1973-Nixon), Will Garwood (1981-Reagan), E. Grady Jolly (1982-Reagan), W. Eugene
Davis (1983-Reagan), Edith Jones (1985-Reagan), Jerry E. Smith (1987-Reagan), Jacques
Wiener (1990-G.H.W. Bush) and Rhesa Barksdale (1990-G.H.W. Bush). Federal Judicial
Center, Judges of the United States Courts, http://www.fic.gov/history/home.nsf.
Writing for the minority was Judge Goldberg. He reiterated his support of the
affirmative duty standard to dismantle the desegregated system announced in the prior
three-judge court decision. He was joined by Judges Henry Politz (1979-Carter), Carolyn
Dineen King (1979-Carter), Samuel D. Johnson (1979-Carter). Judge Patrick
Higginbotham (1982-Reagan) concurred in part and dissented in part. Federal Judicial
Center, Judges of the United States Courts, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf.
99. Ayers v. Allain, 914 F. 2d 676,677 (5th Cir. 1990).
100. Id. at 687. The Fifth Circuit sitting en banc disagreed with the panel's adoption of
the Geier standard. Id. at 686. Rather, it held that the appropriate standard for
determining whether the state of Mississippi met its duty to dismantle its formerly
segregated system of education was the ASTA/Bazemore standard. Id. According to the
Fifth Circuit, application of the Green standard as interpreted in Geier in the higher
education context would frustrate the goal of disestablishment of desegregation in
colleges and universities because of the different nature of the function of choice in the
decision to attend a university. Id. at 686-87. Additionally, the court determined that the
application of the Green standard as interpreted in Geier would frustrate the goal of
diversity that is sought in higher education. Id. Judge Higginbotham, however,
observed that the Fifth Circuit failed to properly articulate the various issues present in
the case:
I reject Green's application to university education because I do not believe the
Fourteenth Amendment supports a substantive right to a particular racial mix,
certainly in the absence of mandatory and state controlled attendance. I am
persuaded that in this context the command of the Fourteenth Amendment
translates to fair process and here find some common ground with the
majority. When a system of higher education presents every person with a
truly equal and free choice among schools, that system will be constitutional.
Well and good, but the long years of separatism have worn long deep traces so
deep that declarations of freedom of choice draped over them are not so easily
translated to real choice. The force of this reality led to the much debated
constitutional rule in Green, fourteen years after Brown v. Board II, and although
I maintain that its restatement of Brown is not applicable to higher education, it
yet informs the present question whether Mississippi is discharging its duty.
Id. at 964 (Higginbotham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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B. The Louisiana Case: United States v. Louisiana
The state of Louisiana is home to eleven public four-year
colleges and universities.101 Southern University 102 and Grambling
University 10 3 are the state's historically black universities. The
remaining institutions: Louisiana State University, 104 University of
New Orleans, 05 Louisiana Tech University, 106 McNeese State
University, 07 Nicholls State University, 08 Northwestern State
101. See Final Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement,
Implementation of the Settlement Agreement at 1-2, United States v. State of Louisiana,
No. 80-3300A (February 2006) [hereinafter Final Annual Evaluation]. The Louisiana
State Board of Regents coordinates the organization and functioning of the higher
education system. Under its supervision, the four-year institutions are part of three
different "systems" within the higher education structure. Id. Grambling, Louisiana
Tech, McNeese, Nicholls, Northwestern, Southeastern, University of Louisiana at
Lafayette, and Monroe Universities comprise the University of Louisiana System. Id.
102. Southern University in Baton Rouge, New Orleans was created pursuant to Act
87 of the Louisiana General Assembly of 1880 for the education of "colored" people.
Southern University, History of Southern University, http://www.subr. edu/
historysubr.html. Southern University A & M, Southern University, New Orleans,
Southern University, Shreveport/Bossier, Southern University Law Center and Southern
University Agricultural Research Center comprise the Southern University System. See
Final Annual Evaluation, supra note 101, at 1-2.
103. Grambling State University, located in Grambling, Louisiana, first opened as an
industrial school for children in 1900.
Grambling State University, History,
http://www.gram.edu/about/history.asp. Act Number 33 of July 4, 1946 renamed the
four-year college Grambling College. Id.
104. All of Louisiana's historically white universities were mandated under law to be
Plessy institutions. See LA. CONST., supra note 27. Louisiana State University ("LSU")
received land grants from the United States government in 1806, 1811, and 1827 and
opened in 1860 as an institution of learning for white seminarians. Louisiana State
University, History of LSU, http://www.lsu.edu/aboutht.htm.
LSU Agricultural
Center, LSU Alexandria, LSU A & M, LSU Eunice, LSU Law Center, LSU Health
Sciences Center-New Orleans, LSU Health Sciences Center-Shreveport, LSU Shreveport
and University of New Orleans comprise the LSU System. See Final Annual Evaluation,
supra note 101, at 1-2.
105. The University of New Orleans was established originally as a New Orleans
campus of Louisiana State University pursuant to 1894 La. Acts 68, §§ 2432-38.
University of New Orleans, UNO History, http://www.uno.edu/history.cfm. In 1974 it
was renamed as the University of New Orleans. Id.
106. Louisiana Tech University first opened in 1894 as Louisiana Polytechnic Institute
in Ruston, Louisiana as an "industrial institute and college for the education of the white
children of the State of Louisiana in the arts and sciences." 1894 La. Act 68, §§ 1-7, cited
in STATE'S LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR: STUDIES IN THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 179
(Pauli Murray ed., 1951).
107. McNeese University was originally a two-year campus of Louisiana State
University located in Lake Charles, Louisiana, which opened in 1939. McNeese State
University, History of McNeese, http://www.mcneese.edu/parents/history.asp.
108. Nicholls State University opened as a junior college division of Louisiana State
University in 1948 pursuant to 1884 La. Acts 51. Nicholls State University, About
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University, 10 9 Southeastern State University, 110 the University of
Louisiana, Lafayette,"' and University of Louisiana, Monroe 112 are
historically white universities. Prior to the United States Supreme
Court decision in Brown I, the state of Louisiana required separation
in higher education pursuant to its state constitutional and statutory
law." 3 Post-Brown I, and before the higher education desegregation
litigation, the state engaged in practices designed to prevent African
Americans from entering its historically white colleges and
universities, thus setting the stage for what was to be over fifty years
of effort, many of them not well spent, in the quest to achieve, and
sometimes to avoid, Brown I equality of opportunity in higher
education.14
The higher education desegregation litigation in Louisiana has
been long, arduous, and protracted. Louisiana was one of ten states
targeted for enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
by the Department of Health Education and Welfare. The original
lawsuit was filed in 1974 in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana. The lawsuit targeted both Title VI and
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection violations resulting from
the state's maintenance of a dual system of education." 5 The
defendants in the lawsuit were the Governor David Treen, the
Louisiana State Board of Education, the Louisiana State Board of
Nicholls, History and Purpose, http://www.nicholls.edu/about/history.html. Id. It
became a four-year institution in 1956. Id.
109. Northwestern State University opened in 1884 as the Louisiana State Normal
School and had as its primary mission the training of public school teachers. It was open
to white males and females. Northwestern State University, Profile, http://www.uls.
state.la.us (follow "UL System" hyperlink; then follow "Universities" hyperlink; then
follow "Northwestern State University" hyperlink).
110. Southeastern State University, opened in 1928 for the purpose of the "higher
education in the arts and sciences of white children of the State." 1928 La. Acts 136.
111. The University of Louisiana, Lafayette opened in 1900 as the Southwestern
Louisiana Industrial Institute. University of Louisiana at Lafayette, University History:
General, http://www.ull.edu/AboutUs/History/General.shtml.
112. The University of Louisiana Monroe, formerly, Northeast Louisiana State
University, opened as a junior college in 1931 and began offering a four-year degree in
1950.
University of Louisiana Monroe, University Relations Historical Sketch,
http://www.ulm.edu/ universityrelations/sketch.html.
113. See LA. CONST., supra note 27.
114. See supra Part II.B.
115. United States v. Louisiana, 527 F. Supp. 509, 512-13 (E.D. La. 1981). In its
complaint, the United States alleged that it tried to seek voluntary compliance from the
State without success. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment suit was waived by the United
States after a standing challenge was raised in the case. United States v. Louisiana, 9
F.3d 1159, 1162 (5th Cir. 1993). However, since the standard for prevailing on a Title VI
case is the same as that for prevailing in a Fourteenth Amendment case, the Title VI
challenge was allowed to proceed. Id. (citing United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp.
642 (E.D. La. 1988) and United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992)).
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Regents, the Board of Supervisors for Louisiana State University,
and the Board of Supervisors for Southern University. Six years
passed before the first pretrial conference was set in the case.11 6
Subsequent to an eight-day pre-trial conference in 1980, the
parties entered settlement negotiations resulting in a proposed
consent decree, which was ultimately accepted by the court on
September 8, 1981.117 In an opinion written by Judge Charles
Schwartz, 118 a three-judge court found that the Consent Decree met
the requisites for federal court approval. 119 Crucial to the court's
approval were the parties' promises to direct their efforts towards
the recruitment and admission of other-race students to the
previously historically white and historically black institutions, the
reduction of attrition of African-American students at historically
white institutions, the reduction of program duplication created by
the dual system, the preservation and enhancement of historically
black colleges and universities, and increasing the presence of otherrace members in institutional staffing, faculties and supervisory
boards.120

Pursuant to the Consent Decree terms, on December 29, 1987,
the United States requested a hearing to measure the state's
compliance with the 1981 agreement. 121 Upon cross motions for
summary judgment by the parties, the United States Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana determined that the State was liable for
violations of Title VI because it had not met its responsibilities
under the agreement: the State still maintained a dual system of
higher education. 122 Judge Schwartz's opinion was critical of the
parties' primary focus on the remedial phase of the lawsuit, which
he found to have resulted from a misunderstanding of the standard
116. See United States v. Louisiana, 527 F. Supp. at 513. Although the Court's
involvement remained relatively limited between 1974 and 1980, during this period the
parties were engaged in discovery, the disposition of several overlapping cases and with
certain issues of intervention.
117. See id. at 515.
118. President Gerald Ford appointed Judge Charles Schwartz to the Eastern District
of Louisiana federal bench in 1976. Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the United States
Courts, http://www.c.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj.
119. United States v. Louisiana, 527 F. Supp. at 515. "In summary the Court finds that
the consent decree which it approved ...embodies a reasonable and specific systemwide desegregation plan which promises realistically to work." Id.
120. Id.
121. United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. 642, 647 (E.D. La. 1988).
122. Id. at 653-57. (stating that while the mere existence of schools of predominantly
one race or another is not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment without a showing
that this condition resulted from intentionally segregative actions on the part of the
state, Louisiana's freedom of choice policy, allowing students to choose which college to
attend, was insufficient to demonstrate that the state was not operating a racially based
dual college education system).
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by which the state's liability for constitutional violations was to be
measured.123
The United States and the state of Louisiana argued that the
appropriate measure of the state's duty was that set by the United
States Supreme Court in Bazemore.124 Specifically, the United States
argued that the Bazemore standard would only require the higher
education system to adopt race-neutral practices in all facets of its
operations in order to meet the Brown I requirement of equal
educational opportunity.1 25 Judge Schwartz's opinion entered the
fray of this hotly debated constitutional question, as had the Sixth
Circuit in Geier v. University of Tennessee, 126 as would the federal
court for the Northern District of Alabama court in Knight v.
Alabama,127 and ultimately, as would the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Fordice.128 Similar to the Mississippi case,
Ayers v. Allain, Judge Schwartz determined that the standard
established by Green was the appropriate standard for Brown I
compliance. 129 Use of the standard announced in Green would
require higher education systems to "eliminate all of the 'vestiges'
or effects of de jure segregation, root and branch." 130 This meant that
the state of Louisiana had to "eliminate from [its higher education
system] all vestiges of state-imposed segregation." 131 Accordingly,
123. Id. at 654.
124. Id.
125. Id. See STEPHAN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY
OF TITLE VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 191 (The Johns Hopkins University Press
1995). Halpern describes how by the time the Louisiana case was on its way to the Fifth
Circuit the policy of the Civil Rights Division of the Reagan Justice Department was
infused with "color blind" rhetoric. Affirmative action policies were commonly attacked
as "reverse discrimination" and some within the administration criticized the Office of
Civil Rights as "overly intrusive in the affairs of state and local governments." Id. This
characterization of the Office of Civil Rights in 1988 is wholly consistent with the United
States' support of using the Bazemore standard of constitutional compliance.
126. 597 F.2d 1056 (6th Cir. 1979).
127. 787 F. Supp. 1030 (N.D. Ala. 1991).
128. 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
129. United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. at 656.
130. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent, 391 U.S. at 438.
131. United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. at 653 (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267, 289-90 (1977)). Judge Schwartz stated:
The rationale in Green for finding that racially neutral admissions policies may
at times be insufficient to satisfy the constitutional mandate to achieve unity
[sic] systems of public education carries the same force in the higher education
context as it does in the primary and secondary education context; all deliberate
speed to achieve non-racially identifiable colleges is a must, just as it is for
primary and secondary schools.
When open admissions alone fail to
disestablish a segregated school system, be it primary/secondary school system
or a college system, then something more is required ....Had the Supreme
Court held in Green or elsewhere that the remedies beyond open admissions

Winter 2008]

BLACK, WHITE, BROWN, GREEN, AND FORDICE

79

the state's higher education system could not merely adopt raceneutral criteria in matters concerning admissions, recruitment,
programming, and staffing. The system was required to take
"affirmative" measures toward dismantling the effects of the prior
dejure system of segregation. 132 Judge Schwartz criticized the state's
performance under the 1981 Consent Decree for "merely enhancing
the State's black schools as black schools rather than towards
converting its white colleges and black colleges to just colleges." 133
The district court did not decide on a remedy at this juncture, but it
strongly suggested that an appropriate remedy would target
program duplication, the implementation of a junior college system,
the abandonment of open admissions policies, and the elimination
of multiple university governing boards. 3 4
Because the court had already determined the state's liability,
the case was scheduled for trial to begin on September 22, 1988, on
the limited issue of remedy. 35 However, the matter lingered on the
docket for the Eastern District for the remainder of 1988 and for a
significant portion of 1989. To assist in the resolution of the
litigation, the court appointed a Special Master during the interim.
The Special Master's report was ultimately adopted by the district
court as its own order on the issue of remedy. 136 The report
required consolidation of the multi-board university system into a
single board system. 137 The single governing board was tasked with
the job of implementing the court's order regarding the
abandonment of open admissions policies, the creation of a tiered
system of universities wherein they were classified according to
mission status, the development of a comprehensive community
college system, and the thorough review of all programmatic
offerings to remedy the problem of unnecessary program
duplication created by proximate universities.138 The two most
policies were limited to policies of mandatory student assignments to particular
schools or programs, then this Court would be more inclined to follow the
approach in Ayers. Such, however, is not the case. This distinction between
primary/secondary education and higher education simply means that the

appropriate remedy may well differ in the two contexts.
Id. at 656.
132. Id. at 653.
133. Id. at 658 (quoting Norris v. State Council of Higher Ed. for Va., 327 F. Supp.

1368, 1373 (E.D. Va. 1971)).
134.
135.
136.
137.

See
See
See
See

id. at 658.
id. at 644.
United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 499, 515-21 (E.D. La. 1989).
id. at 515.

138. Id. at 516-19. "Geographic proximate institutions" are created by the state when
historically black and historically white institutions are established within close

geographic proximity of each other. See United States v. Louisiana, 9 F. 3d 1159, 1165
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controversial pieces of the Special Master's report, which required a
single educational governing board, and the merger of Southern
University Law Center into LSU Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
destined the case for a return visit to the Fifth Circuit. 139
While the Louisiana case was pending on appeal, the Fifth
Circuit decided the Mississippi case, determining that Brown I
compliance required only that a state abandon its de jure system of
segregation and replace it with race neutral practices. 140 Based on
this opinion, the district court's remedial order was vacated and
summary judgment was granted for the state defendants. 141 By
October 30, 1990, the Fifth Circuit's Bazemore standard had been
applied in both the Mississippi and Louisiana cases.
C. Starting Over With a Standard to Measure Unitary Status:
Applying United States v. Fordice in Mississippi and
Louisiana
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Ayers v.
Mabus on April 15, 1991, (the Mississippi case) 142 while the higher
education suits in Louisiana, 143 Tennessee, 144 and Alabama 145 were
still in the federal district and circuit courts. In an opinion delivered
by Justice White and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices
(5th Cir. 1993).
139. United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. at 519; see Part IV.E.
140. Ayers v. Allain, 914 F. 2d 676, 687 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that "to fulfill its
affirmative duty to disestablish its prior system of de jure segregation in higher
education, the state of Mississippi satisfies its constitutional obligation by discontinuing
prior discriminatory practices and adopting and implementing good-faith, race neutral
policies and procedures").
141. United States v. Louisiana, 751 F. Supp. 606, 608 (E.D. La. 1990) (stating the Court
"finds that Ayers is both binding and controlling").
142. 499 U. S. 958 (1991). See Ayers, supra note 10 for an explanation of the change in
party names.
143. See supra Part III.B.
144. See Geier v. University of Tennessee, 597 F. 2d 1056 (6th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444
U. S. 886 (1979). In 1979, well in advance of the Fifth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit concluded
that the "Green requirement of an affirmative duty applies to public higher education as
well as to education at the elementary and secondary school levels." Id. at 1065.
145. See United States v. Alabama, 787 F. Supp. 1030 (N.D. Ala. 1991). On December
30, 1991, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
determined that the duty of the State of Alabama was to "eliminate vestiges of
discrimination root and branch to the extent practicable." Id. at 1357. Citing the standard
from Board of Education v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991), the court announced that the
elimination of the vestiges of discrimination, root and branch, could be accomplished in
the state of Alabama without "harm[ing] the unique characteristics of higher education
in Alabama." Id.
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Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, 146 Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, 147
the Supreme Court settled a disagreement among the circuits as to
the constitutional measure of a higher education system's
compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment when segregative
effects and racial identifiability remain after de jure segregation has
been eliminated. The Court held that in some contexts courts
should not judge the compliance of a state's system of higher
education with the Fourteenth Amendment by the mere fact that
students have freedom to choose their schools. 148 Justice White
applied the standard of "affirmative action" from Green and placed
the burden of proof on the state to demonstrate that it had
dismantled its prior dual system of racial segregation. 149 The Court
determined that if the
state perpetuate[d] policies and practices traceable to its prior
system that continue[d] to have segregative effects whether by
influencing student enrollment decision or by fostering
segregation in other facets of the university system and such
policies [were] without sound educational justification and
[could] be practicably eliminated, the State had not satisfied its
burden of proving that it has dismantled its prior system. 5 0
The Court identified four practices in the Mississippi system to
be evaluated upon remand to the district court. It instructed the
151
district court to review the system's admission standards,
146. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which she sought to establish
that "it is Mississippi's burden to prove that it has undone its prior segregation, and that
the circumstances in which a State may maintain a policy or practice traceable to de jure
segregation that has segregative effects are narrow." United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S.
717, 743-44 (1992) (O'Connor, J, concurring), cert. granted as Ayers v. Mabus, 499 U. S.
958 (1991). See Ayers, supra note 10 for an explanation of the change in party names.
147. Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion in which he emphasized the value of
the historically black college or university:
[W]e do not foreclose the possibility that there exists 'sound educational
justification' for maintaining historically black colleges as such. Despite the
shameful history of state-enforced segregation, these institutions have survived
and flourished. Indeed, they have expanded as opportunities for blacks to enter
historically white institutions have expanded. Between 1954 and 1980, for
example, enrollment at historically black colleges increased form 70,000 to
200,000 students while degrees awarded increased from 13,000 to 32,000.
Id. at 745 (Thomas, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 730-32.
149. Id. at 743 (placing the burden on the state to take affirmative action to eliminate
all vestiges of past dejure segregation and directing district court to consider its remedial
measures in light of the standards set by the Court).
150. Id. at 731.
151. Id. at 733-38. The Court found the differential admissions requirements between
universities with dissimilar programmatic missions to be inadequately justified. It
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program duplication, 152 institutional mission assignments, 153 and
continued operation of all eight public universities. 5 4 The district
court was tasked with determining whether the practices
contributed to the racial identifiability of the institutions, whether
they were educationally unsound, and if so, whether they could
practicably be eliminated.15 5
1.

The Mississippi Case Post-Fordice

Judge Biggers had presided over this case for more than seven
years by the time it was remanded. The current status of the state's
higher education admissions standards, programmatic offerings,
institutional mission assignments, and the number of public
universities suggested to Judge Biggers that vestiges of the prior
segregated system of higher education remained. 156 After a twomonth trial on the merits, Judge Biggers' remedial decree
permanently enjoined the state from "maintaining remnants and
vestiges of the prior de jure system" and he set up a Monitoring
Committee to oversee the implementation of the terms of the court's
judgment.157 The remedial decree created specific requirements of
the system of higher education with respect to new admissions
standards for first-time freshmen to be implemented in 1995-1996
158 It
and it redefined the institutional missions of some universities.
is important to note that his remedial decree did not require the
1 59
merger or closure of any institutions.
viewed these as "remnants of the dual system with a continuing discriminatory effect."
Id. at 736.
152. Id. at 738-39. Unnecessary program duplication occurs when "two or more
institutions offer the same nonessential or non-core program." Id. at 738.
153. Id. at 739-41. A university's institutional mission assignment is its academic
purpose, "what an institution sees itself to be in a broad philosophical sense, including
its major goals [and] the way it sees its major responsibilities." Id. The Court found that
the institutional mission assignments adopted in 1981 had as precursors, the policies
previously enacted to further racial segregation. Id. at 740.
154. Id. at 741-42. The Court directed the lower courts to consider "whether retention
of all eight universities itself affects student choice and perpetuates the segregated
higher education system, whether maintenance of each of the universities is
educationally justifiable, and whether one or more of them can be practicably closed or
merged." Id. at 742.
155. Id. at 743.
156. Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. 1419, 1493-94 (N.D. Miss. 1995). Judge Biggers
found that although all four aspects of educational system were vestiges of prior
discrimination, not that all continued to have segregative effects.
157. Id. at 1494.
158. Id. at 1494-96.
159. See id. at 1493-96. In a subsequent ruling, Judge Biggers rejected the private
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Since Judge Biggers' initial post-Fordice ruling in 1995, the Fifth
Circuit has made only one significant ruling in the case. 160 The Fifth
Circuit heard the plaintiffs' appeal challenging portions of the
161
decree regarding the adoption of uniform admissions standards,
162
admissions designations of universities within the system,
program duplication issues which might result in the merger of
historically black and historically white colleges, 163 the state's
funding formula for universities, 164 facilities disparities between

plaintiffs' objection to the expansion of programmatic offerings at a branch of the
University of Southern Mississippi, but enjoined the Board of Trustee's institution of
differential admissions standards at this campus. Ayers v. Fordice, 40 F. Supp. 2d 382,
387-88 (N.D. Miss. 1999). While the court did not agree with the plaintiffs' argument
that adding a lower division to the curriculum of the University of Southern MississippiGulf Coast would impede the implementation of the desegregation decree, it
determined that a race-based admissions standard allowing the entering class at the new
University of Southern Mississippi branch to reflect the area population would be
incompatible with the goal of eliminating the vestiges of de jure segregation under the
Fordice standard. Id. See also infra Part IV.E.
160. Ayers v. Fordice, 111 F.3d 1183 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming most of district court's
findings of fact and remedial decree).
161. Ayers, 879 F. Supp. at 1434. Judge Biggers concluded that the 1987 admissions
standards that required higher ACT scores for the historically white colleges and lower
scores for historically black colleges were facially neutral, but had continuing
discriminatory and segregative effects. The "channeling effect" of different ACT
requirements combined with numerous racially identifiable institutions with duplicative
course offerings in close geographic proximity to each other compounded the problem.
Id. Judge Biggers ordered the adoption of uniform admissions standards, which would
become effective during the 1995-1996 academic year. Id. at 1494. Additionally, Judge
Biggers determined that the practice of using an ACT cutoff score as the basis for the
award of alumni scholarships at the historically white colleges did not contribute to the
racial identifiability of the colleges. Id. at 1434.
162. Id. at 1494-95. Judge Biggers' remedial decree required a site-evaluation study of
existing programs at Jackson State University, designated programmatic enhancements
for Jackson State University and Alcorn State University, development of practices to
increase racial diversity at Jackson State University, increased fiscal funding for Jackson
State University, creation of an Endowment Trust whose income would support otherrace recruitment and other-race scholarships for Jackson State and Alcorn State
University students. Id.
163. Id. at 1494. Judge Biggers found continued and pervasive program duplication
in the Mississippi system, but determined that program duplication did not necessarily
have present segregative effects. Id. After ordering a study of the program duplication
between Jackson State University, a historically black college and other colleges in the
system, as well as between Delta State University and Mississippi Valley State
University (located within a few miles of each other), Judge Biggers declined to order a
merger of Delta State University and Mississippi State University. Id.
164. Id. at 1453. The trial court found no constitutional defect in the system's current
funding policies and practices, stating "[a]ttainment of funding 'equity' between the
HBIs and HWIs is impractical and educationally unsound. It can neither be attained
within our lifetime, nor.., does it realistically promise to guarantee further
desegregation." Id.
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historically black and historically white colleges, 165 hiring and salary
disparities between historically black and historically white
colleges, 166 land grant assignment disparities, 167 and the racial
composition of higher education governing boards.1 68 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed the trial court's implementation of the uniform
admissions standards within the system, determined that the trial
court was in error when it declared that the use of minimum ACT
scores for the award of scholarships at historically white universities
was not traceable to the prior de jure system of segregation, and
remanded on four other issues respecting the implementation of the
169
remedial decree.
2. The Louisiana Case Post-Fordice
Seven months after the Court's decision in Fordice, Judge
Schwartz reinstated the August 2, 1988, remedial order in United
170
States v. Louisiana, granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs.

165. See id. at 1457-58. The trial court found no vestiges of past dejure segregation in
facilities at historically black and historically white colleges because both faced similar
maintenance and repair problems. Id.
166. Id. at 1462. The trial court recognized the existence of racial identifiability at the
faculty and administrative levels of the historically white colleges, but did concluded
that the racial identifiability was not wholly traceable to the prior de jure system of
segregation. Id. Judge Biggers seemed to revert to a neutral practices analysis that
allowed for his recognition of the "sincere and serious efforts to increase the percentages
of African American faculty and administrators at these institutions." Id. Judge Biggers
commented that all universities in the country are similarly situated because of the small
size of the qualified pool of African Americans in the professoriate. Id.
167. Id. at 1464-66. The trial court found that Alcorn State University, a land grant
institution, experienced limited progress as a research institution and suffered because
of the prior de jure system of segregation. Id. Nevertheless, the court found that an
attempt to apportion academic and research facilities between Mississippi State
University and Alcorn State University would be educationally unsound. Id.
168. Id. at 1473. The trial court found no evidence of practices which "den[ied] or
dilut[ed] the representation of black citizens on the governing board," nor was there
evidence of any "arbitrar[y] limit on the activities of the administrators of HBIs in a way
that impede[ed] their ability to protect the rights of their students." Id.
169. Ayers v. Fordice, 111 F. 3d 1183, 1195, 1228 (5th Cir. 1997). The Fifth Circuit
approved of the uniform admissions standards but remanded on the issue of remedial
developmental courses, which had been largely eliminated under the trial court's
remedial decree. On remand, the district court was directed to further evaluate the
Board of Trustee's position on the possibility of merger between Mississippi Valley
State University and Delta State University, order an evaluation of the propriety of
enhancing programs at Alcorn State University and increasing white enrollment there,
evaluate the accreditation attainment status of business programs at Jackson State
University, and make further findings respecting equipment funding disparities. Id.
170. 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19854, at *29 (E.D. La. Dec. 23, 1992).
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On appeal, the Fifth Circuit determined that Judge Schwartz's grant
of summary judgment on the issue of liability was improvident. 171
The court found genuine issues of material facts on the matters of
unnecessary program duplication and whether definable
educational justifications for the duplicative programs in
geographically proximate institutions existed. 172 Furthermore, the
court found genuine and material issues of fact regarding the
various open admissions programs and whether they were
responsible for the continuing segregative effects. 173 Upon remand
to the trial court for the application of Fordice in light of the Fifth
Circuit's reversal of summary judgment, Judge Schwartz made it
clear to the parties that this higher education case was not a "back to
the starting block matter." 174 Because there was a substantial record
in the case, the court would only hear the aisputed issues of fact
defined by the Fifth Circuit.175
IV. Structuring, Implementing and Evaluating Higher
Education Desegregation Plans: Were the Mississippi and
Louisiana Plans Designed for Success?

The parties in the Mississippi and Louisiana cases were
constitutionally bound to enter settlement agreements that complied
with the requirements of Fordice, and the only accountability
measures for the assurance of constitutional compliance were
Judges Biggers and Schwartz.
Given the multiple areas for
remediation after the Fordice decision, the parties in both cases
should have been tremendously motivated to settle the lawsuits
amicably. The crafting of a remedy by a federal judge could have
yielded harsh outcomes. 176 Two years after the State Supreme Court
decision in Fordice, in February of 1994, settlement negotiations in
the Louisiana case resumed, culminating in a new Settlement
Agreement in November of that year. 177 The Mississippi case,
171. United States v. Louisiana, 9 F.3d 1159, 1171 (5th Cir. 1993) (vacating remedial
order).
172. Id. at 1168-69 (discussing different expert opinions and stating that evidence
leaves room for different inferences).

173. Id. at 1166, 1170.
174. United States v. Louisiana, 1994 WL 374210, at *2 (E.D. La. July 13, 1994).
175. Id.
176. See infra Part IV.E.
177. Settlement Agreement, United States v. Louisiana, No. 80-3300A (Nov. 4, 1994)
[hereinafter 1994 Louisiana Settlement Agreement].
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which provided the Supreme Court with the opportunity to define
and clarify the measure for Brown I compliance in higher education,
would not settle for another seven years. 178
Settlement negotiations in the Mississippi case began in June of
2000.179 On March 29, 2001, some of the private plaintiffs and the
defendants entered into a Settlement Agreement and Judge Biggers
entered a final judgment in the case on February 15, 2002,
dismissing the case with prejudice, thus ending the Ayers
litigation.180 When other private plaintiffs disapproved of the
settlement's terms and appealed Judge Biggers' order, the Fifth
Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision and
approved the Agreement. 181 Unlike the Settlement Agreement in
United States v. Louisiana, the Mississippi Settlement Agreement
failed to state a period of time within which the state's progress
under the Agreement would be monitored for compliance with the
standards under Fordice. Rather, the Agreement declared that its
goal was to "[achieve] the finality of the Ayers litigation. " 182 With
Judge Biggers' approval of the Agreement came the release of the
Board of Trustees and all other defendants from all constraints of
the court's remedial decree and federal court oversight. 183
The expiration of the Louisiana Settlement Agreement and the
release of the Mississippi system from federal court scrutiny provide
an opportunity for a Fordice retrospective on both systems. The
requirements of Fordice are not merely aspirational. They set the

178. Mississippi Settlement Agreement, supra note 34.

179. Ayers v. Musgrove No. 4:75CV009-B-D, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1973, at *7 (N.D.
Miss. Jan. 2, 2002) (noting that while trial court was implementing its remedial plan,
officials of both the state of Mississippi and United States announced that they were
beginning negotiations to settle Ayers case). See Mississippi Plaintiffs Make First Proposal
In College Desegregation Case, BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION, October 12, 2000;
Gina Holland, Nicholson: Ayers Case Needs To Be Over College Board Wants To Settle Case,
SUN HERALD, June 14, 2000, at A4.
180. Ayers v. Musgrove, No. 4:75CV009-B-D, slip. op. (N. D. Miss. Feb. 15, 2002).

Before he approved the parties' Settlement Agreement, Judge Biggers required a
concurrent resolution from the Mississippi legislature indicating their support for the

costly settlement proposal. Ayers v. Musgrove, No. 4:75CV009-B-D, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1973, at *14-16 (N.D. Miss. Jan 2, 2002). The Mississippi State House of
Representatives and Senate assented to the parties Settlement Agreement during the

2002 regular legislative session.

House Concurrent Resolution No. 28, Mississippi

Legislature, 2002 Session.
181. Ayers v. Thompson, 358 F.3d 356, 375 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 951

(2004).
182. Mississippi Settlement Agreement, supra note 34, at 3.
183. Mississippi Settlement Agreement, supra note 34, at 3-4 ("When this Agreement
becomes final, the Board will be free to fulfill its constitutional and statutory duties and
responsibilities under Mississippi law wholly unfettered by the Ayers litigation except
as specified in this Agreement.").
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minimum criteria for measuring whether a higher education system
has disestablished its dual system of higher education. 184 Therefore,
post-Fordice success requires a concerted focus on "sound
educational practices," and it is only through this focus that states
may "disentangle" race from education thereby transforming "white
185
colleges" and "black colleges" to "just colleges."
The Settlement Agreement in United States v. Louisiana targeted
ten areas for action under its ten-year plan. Governance,
classification of proximate institutions, admissions criteria,
community colleges, enhanced programmatic offerings at
black colleges, capital
outlay funding, two
historically
geographically proximate Plessy law schools, and other-race
recruitment and employment provided the structure for the
186
implementation of Fordice evaluation in United States v. Louisiana.
In contrast, the Mississippi Settlement Agreement focused on five
areas for desegregation implementation, all involving changes at the
Summer
state's historically black colleges and universities.
developmental education, enhanced programmatic offerings at
historically black colleges, structured endowments for the benefit of
historically black colleges, capital improvement expenditures for
historically black colleges, and legislative commitment for
operational and capital improvement needs were the areas for
action and implementation under the Mississippi Settlement
Agreement.187
The parties did not carve out any areas of
responsibility for the state's historically white colleges.
Some cognitive dissonance exists respecting the complete
dismantling of prior de jure systems under Fordice and the standard
for successful performance under any settlement agreement.
Intuitively, one might think that complete dismantlement under
Fordice should require 100% compliance with the terms of an
agreement. However, the courts have resolved the dissonance by
interpreting settlement agreements in desegregation lawsuits as
contracts.1 8 8 As contracts, the standard for successful performance
is substantial compliance rather than 100% compliance with the

184. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 728 (1992) ("[A] State does not discharge
its constitutional obligations until it eradicates policies and practices traceable to its prior
dejure [sic] dual system that continue to foster segregation.").
185. See Green, supra note 14.

186. 1994 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, supra note 177, at 2-24.
187. Mississippi Settlement Agreement, supra note 34, at 4-13 (describing both
financial and academic terms of the settlement).
188. See Ayers v. Musgrove, No. 4:75CV009-B-D, 2002 WL 91895, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Jan.
2, 2002) (stating that Mississippi's obligations under the Proposal are equally enforceable
as obligations under any other contract).
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terms of an agreement. 189 Now that the Louisiana Settlement
Agreement has expired under its own terms and the higher
education system in Mississippi has been released from federal
court supervision, a commentary on the structure of each
Agreement and the states' progress to date is valuable in
determining whether the states' substantial compliance has allowed
its universities to reach the standard of "just colleges," erasing their
racial identifiability.
Moreover, this critique is valuable in
questioning whether the "just colleges" standard requires a
conclusion that the universities be racially non-identifiable, whether
racial non-identifiability is truly desirable, or whether racial nonidentifiability is even possible.
Critiquing the end result under the Louisiana Settlement
189. Good faith implementation of obligations to desegregate under a consent decree
may relieve a party to that decree of its duties and entitle said party to termination of
subsequent litigation. See, e.g., Lee v. Auburn City Bd. of Educ., No. 70-T-851-E, 2002
WL 237091 (M.D. Ala. Feb, 14, 2002). It was the intent of the drafters of the Louisiana
Settlement Agreement that substantial performance under the Settlement Agreement
meant that the State would have complied with the requisites of Fordice necessary as a
predicate for a declaration of unitary status. 1994 Louisiana Settlement Agreement,
supra note 177, at 29-30. The text of the Agreement provides guidance in this area and
illustrates that the Louisiana Agreement cannot derogate the requirements of Brown I,
Green or Fordice. The Agreement specifically states that program duplication matters
will be settled under the Fordice standard. 1994 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, supra
note 177, at 31. All other subjects covered by the Agreement purportedly will be
governed by the question of whether the State of Louisiana has performed its promises
under the Agreement. The Agreement specifically states that if a court finds that
Louisiana has complied with the Louisiana Agreement, the Court shall dismiss the suit
with prejudice and if Louisiana has not complied, the Court shall order compliance by
specifically stating which actions Louisiana must take in order to comply with the
Agreement. Id. at 31-32. There is no authoritative case law in the higher education
context on the question of whether the State of Louisiana can be released with less than
complete performance under the Agreement. However, there is case law in the context
of elementary and secondary desegregation which suggests that Louisiana can be
released without having rendered complete performance. In an opinion written by
Justice Rehnquist the Supreme Court considered whether the Board of Education of
Oklahoma City could be released from federal court oversight after its substantial, but
not complete, performance under a desegregation decree. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub.
Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991). The Court determined that the appropriate
question to be considered on remand was "whether the Board had complied in good faith
with the desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past
discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable." Id. (emphasis added). A
reviewing Court could borrow from Dowell in order to give content "to the extent
practicable," if it is inclined to do so, and find that substantial compliance with Fordice
will suffice and release the system from oversight. Here, a reviewing federal court is
unlikely to be trapped by language relating to "unitary" or "dual status" in evaluating
implementation of the Louisiana Settlement Agreement because the Dowell Court's
holding would guide a federal court, insofar as it states "it is a mistake to treat words
such as 'dual' and 'unitary' as if they were actually found in the Constitution." Id. at
245.
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Agreement and the current progress under the Mississippi
Settlement Agreement can be accomplished by analyzing the states'
progress along a continuum of ten variables identified by a Southern
Education Foundation report as necessary for effective
Thorough and
desegregation of a higher education system.
complete dismantlement of a prior de jure system requires:
A) creation and implementation of an effective long range statewide plan; B) implementation of the state-wide plan at the
institutional level; C) creation and implementation of individual
institutional missions, each of which focuses on minority access; D)
creation of a specific plan for student retention and continued
matriculation; E) valuing community colleges as an integral part of
equal educational opportunity; F) valuing, structuring and
placement of the historically black college as an integral part of a
diverse system of higher education; G) using merger and closure of
the historically black institution as a last resort; H) use of public and
private sectors in developing effective strategies for implementing
the desegregation plan; 190 I) ensuring adequate financing for
implementation of the desegregation plan; and J)accountability for
measurable outcomes for success and failure. 191
A. The Long Range State-Wide Plan
The concept of using a state-wide problem-solving approach to
higher education desegregation was first enunciated by the Court of

190. S. EDUc. FOUND., REDEEMING THE AMERICAN PROMISE, REPORT OF THE PANEL ON
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

AND POSTSECONDARY

DESEGREGATION xvi-xvii

(1995).

"Collaborative leadership" should be the goal when a state seeks to draw from the
strength of all its resources in formulating a comprehensive and effective desegregation
plan. One supportive element creating a successful desegregation effort involves reliable
enforcement and oversight of desegregation efforts from the Civil Rights Division of the
United States Department of Justice. Id. at 51. For a critical analysis of variances in the
aggressiveness of the Justice Department's Title VI enforcement concomitant with
changes in Presidential administrations, see HALPERN, supra note 126. Additionally,
private business sector and private non-profit organization involvement as cocommunity partners is indispensable to a successful desegregation effort. S. EDUC.
FOUND., at 51-52. Interests of the state, the private business and the private non-profit
sectors should converge with those of the community at large respecting the
development of an educated citizenry. Id. This dynamic is extraordinarily valuable in
creating an "opportunity-driven vision of public higher education." Id. Of these
collaborative factors, the only one visible to any measurable respect in either the
Louisiana or the Mississippi plan is the creation of the private sector endowment in the
Mississippi Settlement Agreement. Mississippi Settlement Agreement, supra note 34, at
9-12.
191. S.EDUC. FOUND., supra note 190, at xvi-xvii.

HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5

Appeals in Adams v. Richardson192 in 1973 and embraced as policy by
HEW in 1978.193 An effective desegregation plan cannot attempt to
remedy current de facto 194
effects of prior de jure segregation on a
"school-by-school basis."
Of course, each institution within a
system would necessarily have a role in implementing a sound
desegregation plan.195
A well-structured and comprehensive
statewide plan, "embodying those specific affirmative, remedial steps
which [would] prove effective in achieving significant progress
toward the disestablishment of the structure of the dual system,
[addressing] the problem of system-wide racial imbalance," allows a
dual higher education system to successfully convert to a unitary
196
one.
The desirability of the state-wide long range plan stems from
the common sense realization that systemic racism and racial
discrimination in higher education systems evolved both under law
and later under practices and policies. Hence, a sea-change in the
higher education system structure cannot occur in an instant. In
order to cure these ills, a state must first demonstrate a sincere
commitment to dismantlement. In turn, a sincere commitment to
change requires a structured plan wherein parties approach
problem solving by envisioning the education system as a whole.
The settlement history in the Louisiana case reflects the absence of
this approach, as well as the difficulty experienced by the parties in
crafting a desegregation plan that had a realistic possibility of
dismantling a prior de jure system of segregation, root and branch.
The 1974 litigation in United States v. Louisiana culminated in its
first Consent Decree on September 8, 1981.197 Judge Charles
Schwartz approved the agreement after several years of litigation,
citing the court's preference for allowing parties to "voluntar[ily]
com[ply] with the law." 198 The Consent Decree addressed six
specific matters of concern to the court: 1) admissions processes of
institutions; 2) achieving successful matriculation of other-race
students in historically white and historically black institutions; 3)
program duplication in geographic proximate institutions; 4) status
of historically black colleges and universities; 5) hiring policies and
192. Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1164-66 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also Part II.B.
193. See Adams, 480 F.2d at 1164-66; see also HALPERN, supra note 125, at 162-66.
194. See Adams, 480 F.2d at 1164.
195. See id. at 1164-65.
196. Revised Criteria Specifying the Ingredients of Acceptable Plans To Desegregate
State Systems of Public Higher Education, 43 Fed. Reg. 32, 6659 (Feb.15, 1978); see also
Adams, 480 F.2d at 1164-67 (reiterating need for structured state-wide plan in order to
effectively achieve desegregation).
197. United States v. Louisiana, 527 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. La. 1981).
198. Id. at 511.
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practices of all universities respecting other-race staff and faculty;
and 6) the structure of the governing boards of colleges and
universities. 199 Because the Consent Decree addressed each of these
factors, the court concluded it represented a lawful, reasonable, and
equitable remedy, which was not in derogation of public policy, and
200
it received the approval of the court.
The 1981 Consent Decree remained operable until its expiration
on December 31, 1987.201 Annual reports evaluating the progress
under the agreement were generated for each year beginning on
August 15, 1982.202 On December 29, 1987, the United States moved
to determine whether the State of Louisiana had successfully
performed under the Consent Decree. 203 At a hearing on the matter,
Judge Schwartz concluded that in implementing the Consent
Decree, the State had not met its duty under Brown 1.204 The United
States was also critical of the state's implementation of the
agreement. Specifically, it was the position of the United States that
the State's failure lay in its refusal to spend money in support of
desegregation as it had promised under the agreement. 205 However,
Judge Schwartz refocused the discussion by finding fault with the
"entire structure of the consent decree":
If money were the sole problem, then there should still be
improvement, though perhaps an insufficient improvement for
constitutional purposes, in the desegregation of Louisiana's public
universities. The consent decree as implemented was directed
more towards merely enhancing the State's black schools as black
schools rather than towards convert[ing] its white colleges and
black colleges to just colleges. 206
I suggest that Judge Schwartz's criticism was in need of further
fine-tuning. The 1981 Agreement was defective in two respects.
The plan's structure focused on institutional initiatives that were
only aspirational in nature and voluntary in practice. Moreover, it
focused on institutional initiatives operable under freedom of choice

199. Id. at 515 (discussing commitments made by consent decree).
200. See id.
201. Consent Decree at 29, United States v. Louisiana, No. 80-3300 (Sep. 8, 1981)
[hereinafter 1981 Louisiana Consent Decree].
202. Id. at 27.
203. United States v Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. 642, 647 (E.D. La. 1988).
204. Id. at 657 (finding that the state continued to foster "polarization and separation
on a racial basis").
205. Id. at 658.
206. Id. (quoting Norris v. State Council of Higher Ed. for Va., 327 F. Supp. 1368, 1373
(E.D. Va. 1971)).
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plans. 207 When the focus of the 1981 Consent Decree became the
"black college problem" focusing primarily on enhancement criteria
for historically black colleges, the opportunity for a systemic
approach to problem solving was lost.208 The problem in the plan
lay in its failure to conceptualize the remaining vestiges of
segregation in Louisiana higher education properly as a systemic
state-wide problem, requiring a systemic state-wide approach under
the Adams/HEW formulation. 209 In Fordice, the Court explained
that vestiges of segregation in particular universities informed the
conclusion that the whole system was unconstitutional. This clearly
articulated standard for unitary status brought comprehensibility to
the 1994 settlement process and stimulated the structure of the 1994
Agreement as a state-wide plan. Additionally, the ten-year term of
the Agreement seemed to provide a suitable framework within
which the desegregation effort could be addressed.
At the time United States v. Louisiana settled in 1994 and Ayers v.
Fordice settled in 2001, both Judge Schwartz and Judge Biggers were
faced with parties who were contenders in two of the longest
running higher education desegregation cases on record. 210 The
protraction of these pieces of litigation speaks to the intractable
nature of solving firmly entrenched segregative practices postBrown I and II. Further, it demonstrated why the parties could not
207. Id. at 657-59.
208. 1981 Louisiana Consent Decree, supra note 201, at 17-26. The 1981 Louisiana
Consent Decree provided various enhancements at the historically black colleges and
universities; however, at the expiration of the agreement, the historically black colleges
had not progressed. They did not have the same state support or quality of facilities as
the historically white colleges. See United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. at 657.
Student recruitment, increased access initiatives and other-race employee initiatives
were left to individual institutions to implement without the guidance of a system-wide
structure, or accountability.
209. The problem of the "black college" as the focus of what is "wrong" with a system
of higher education existed in minds of the primary governmental actors during the
1970s-80s litigation in Louisiana. See generally Louisiana,692 F. Supp. 642. The failure to
view the higher education system as whole, consisting of historically white colleges and
historically black colleges which were both unconstitutional products of a prior de jure
system, prevented the state from successfully confecting and implementing the Consent
Decree of 1981. This viewpoint has currency today. One need only look at the postHurricane Katrina discussion concerning the propriety of rebuilding the totally
devastated campus of Southern University, New Orleans. This historically black college
can only be so readily dismissed as a valueless, disposable rennant of a segregated past
because of the lack of psychological ownership of the institution by a system refusing to
recognize itself as an unconstitutional whole. See SUNO Repair Not Reasonable, ADVOC.
(Baton Rouge, La.), Oct. 17, 2005, at 6B; Will Sentell, SUNO Officials Tout Service School
Offers To Underserved, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Oct. 22, 2005, at 1B; Coleman Warner,
Housing Called Critical To Recovery at SUNO; Officials Envisions FEMA Trailer Park,TIMESPICAYUNE, Oct. 8, 2005, at A01.
210. See supra Part II.B.

Winter 2008]

BLACK, WHITE, BROWN, GREEN, AND FORDICE

93

easily come to an amicable, constitutional settlement amongst
themselves.
A very important facet of both the Mississippi and Louisiana
Settlement Agreements was the requirement that they be calculated
to operate for a sufficient length of time, thus producing the desired
long-range effects. A well-structured plan must prescribe the length
of time within which the higher education system will be monitored
for compliance with the terms of the decree, thus setting a baseline
for when the systems may seek a Declaration of Unitary Status from
the court. One incentive for full and timely compliance with the
directives under the Louisiana Settlement Agreement was the hope
of certain release from federal court oversight within some
definitive and foreseeable period of time.
As a creation of recent history, the effectiveness of the
Mississippi Settlement Agreement has yet to be proven. With the
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Ayers on October 18, 2004,
the Agreement became effective and the federal court released the
system from oversight and retained jurisdiction only to enforce the
terms of the Agreement. 211 The federal court's supervisory powers
extend solely to enforcement of several of the funding provisions,
which are to be provided over a period of several years. 212
However, several provisions within the Agreement cannot be fully
evaluated until their funding timelines expire. 213 In some instances,
the state of Mississippi will require a minimal period of seventeen
years before a full evaluation can be made respecting the
effectiveness of its desegregation efforts, even though it has been
released from federal court supervision. 214 The theoretical question
that remains is whether the higher education system should have
been released until all of the Ayers funding ended.
Finally, there exists a question regarding the failure of both
plans to comprehensively view their public school systems and their
211. See Ayers v. Thompson, 543 U. S. 951 (2004).

212. The summer development programs were established and are to be continually
funded for a period of eight years. These funds were to be provided over and above all

financial assistance that was available at the time of 1995 Settlement Agreement.
Mississippi Settlement Agreement, supra note 34, at 15. The publicly and privately
funded endowments were established and are to be continually funded over a fourteen-

year period. Id. at 9-12. Capital outlay projects for Alcorn State University, Jackson State
University,
years from
Agreement
above the

and Mississippi Valley State University were authorized for a period of five
the date of implementation of the agreement. Id. at 12-14. The Settlement
required the Mississippi legislature to create special Ayers funding over and
funding previously identified in the Agreement for specific academic

programs at Alcorn State University, Jackson State University and Mississippi Valley
State University for a period of seventeen years. Id. at 14-16.
213. See id.
214. See id.
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higher education systems as a gestalt. Both Mississippi and
Louisiana have histories of de jure segregation in their elementary
and secondary public schools. 215 Problems in eliminating vestiges of
segregation in a prior de jure system of higher education are
inextricably bound to problems of prior de jure segregation in public
school education. 2 6 Necessarily, many problems related to the
availability of equal educational opportunity in higher education
owe their origins to inadequacy of both opportunity and outcomes
in elementary and secondary education. An effective state-wide
plan for dismantling the prior de jure segregation in the higher
education systems of both states should have accounted for any
vestiges of segregation that lingered in the public education system.
The Louisiana plan did not address the college preparation
problems that existed in the state respecting the transition from high
school to the university. 217 The Mississippi Settlement Agreement
addressed the matter, but only to a limited degree by authorizing
state financial support for summer school pre-university
enhancement programs for African-American students. 218
B. Institutional Implementation of the State-Wide Plans and
Making Access An Institutional Mission
Although the higher education systems in the states of
Mississippi and Louisiana are viewed by the courts as one entity,
their respective desegregation plans should have required each
university in the system to perform an active role in eliminating the
vestiges of the prior de jure system of segregation in order to be
successful. In its plan of implementation, each university should
have focused on access to quality higher education for students
whose opportunity at their respective institution was formally

215. See supra notes 27-28.
216. S. EDUC. FOUND., supra note 190, at xvi-xvii (discussing problems with de jure
segregation and some proposed solutions).

217. The 1994 Louisiana Agreement addressed high school-university relations for the
sole purpose of acclimatizing the high school student to the other-race university
environment. 1994 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, supra note 177, at 21 (stating that
the programs "shall be designed to reduce the strangeness and alienation students often
associate with other race institutions").
218. The summer program was designed to bridge the gap between twelfth grade and

freshman year in college. The program was first proposed as a remedy of the court in
1995 and it was incorporated into the 2001 Settlement Agreement to be funded for ten
years. Mississippi Settlement Agreement, supra note 34, at 4-5. See also the Summer
Program as it was originally submitted in the remedial proposal of the court in Ayers v.
Fordice, 879 F. Supp. 1419, 1478-79 (N.D. Miss. 1995).
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foreclosed under the de jure system of segregation. 219
Each
institution should have paid more than lip service to access for
students of color and historically disadvantaged students as an
institutional goal. In the Louisiana Settlement Agreement, each
university was tasked to perform a particular role in desegregating
the system. 220 In the Mississippi Settlement Agreement, however,
the
fulcrum
of the
agreement
regarding
institutional
implementation and access rested heavily on historically black
colleges and universities. 221
Maintaining and enhancing the
programmatic offerings and the facilities at the historically black
colleges was the entire focus of the Agreement. 222 The Agreement
contained no terms placing new institutional commitments on the
historically white colleges for eliminating vestiges of prior de jure
segregation. 223 The court ordered each historically black college or
university within the system to "develop, implement, strengthen,
review and modify certain programs in accordance with the
requirements of Fordice."224 Additionally, the income generated
219. See S. EDUC. FOUND., supra note 190, at xviii (discussing proposed
implementation plans).
220. See 1994 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, supra note 177, at 20-24 (describing
institutional responsibility for recruitment and retention of students and university
employees).
221. Mississippi Settlement Agreement, supra note 34, passim. Other-race presence at
many historically white institutions within the system was much higher than at
historically black institutions. See Sum, infra note 363; see also Am. Ass'n of Univ.
Professors, Historically Black Colleges and Universities: Recent Trends (2007), available at
http://www. aaup.org (follow "Publications & Research-Academe" hyperlink; then
follow "2007 Issues" hyperlink; then follow "January-February 2007" hyperlink; then
follow "Reports Posted Elsewhere on Other Sections of the AAUP Website" hyperlink)
(stating that "[tierms of [the] agreement apply only to the three historically black
universities in Mississippi, since the five historically white universities have surpassed
the minimum of 10 percent for nonwhite enrollment").
222. Mississippi Settlement Agreement, supra note 34, passim.
223. According to the Mississippi Settlement Agreement, the status of the historically
white universities at the time of the Settlement Agreement was frozen when the
Agreement became effective and "[t]he only obligations of the Board [of Trustees], and
other defendants, arising out of or related to the Ayers litigation [were] those specified
in [the] Agreement." Id. at 4.
224. The Mississippi Settlement Agreement required the Alcorn State University to
apply this standard to develop, implement, strengthen, review or modify its: Masters of
Business Administration (Natchez); Master of Accounting (Natchez); Bachelor of
Finance (Lorman); Masters of Finance (Natchez); Physician Assistant Masters (Natchez
or Vicksburg); Biotechnology Masters (Lorman); Bachelor of Computer Networking
(Vicksburg); and Bachelor of Environmental Science (Lorman). Mississippi Settlement
Agreement, supra note 34, at 6. The Jackson State University was ordered to develop,
implement, strengthen or review its: Ph.D. in Business; Masters in Urban Planning;
Ph.D. in Urban Planning; Ph.D. in Social Work; Bachelor in Civil Engineering; Bachelor
of Computer Engineering; Bachelor of Telecommunications Engineering; Masters of
Public Health; Bachelor of Healthcare Administration; Masters in Communicative
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from the Public and Private Endowments created by the Agreement
for the benefit of Alcorn State University, Jackson State University
and Mississippi Valley State University were specifically designated
for "other-race marketing and recruitment, including employment
of other-race recruiting personnel and award of other-race student
scholarships." 225
A significant focus of the Louisiana Settlement Agreement was
on the Fordice program duplication factor. 226 The Agreement was
and
to
provide
programmatic
enhancements
designed
differentiation at the historically black colleges. 227 The three
historically black colleges agreed to establish and implement new
programs for the express purpose of "attracting other race
students." 228 Prior to the effective date of the Agreement, each
proximate geographic pairing of historically white universities and
historically black universities were operating under agreements
which offered joint degree programs, dual degree programs or
programs
wherein
cross-registration
between
cooperative
universities was allowed. 229 All of these programs were continued
and some were expanded under the 1994 Agreement. 230 Each
Disorders; Ph.D. in Higher Education; and Ph.D. in Public Health. Id. at 6-7. The
Mississippi Interinstitutional Pharmacy Initiative as well as Jackson State's School of
Allied Health, School of Public Health, and School of Engineering were also subject to
this provision of the plan. Id. at 7. Lastly, Mississippi Valley State University was
ordered to develop implement, strengthen or review the: Bachelor of History; Masters in
Special Education; Bachelor of Special Education; Masters of Computer Science; Masters
in Bioinformatics; Masters in Leadership Administration; and Masters in Business
Administration. Id. The development, implementation, strengthening or reviewing of
the programs must be in concert with "sound educational practices" and "resources
available over time." Id. at 5. The federal court expects substantial implementation and
enhancement of these programs over the seventeen-year period of funding. Id.
225. Id. at 9-10. The Settlement Agreement defined other-race as "persons who are not
African-American." Id. at 10 n.2.
226. See 1994 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, supra note 177, passim.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 10. The Louisiana Agreement defined other-race students as "white
persons at predominately black institutions and black persons at predominately white
institutions." Id. at 8 n.4. During the term of the Settlement Agreement, Southern
University in Baton Rouge agreed to develop and implement programs missing in their
curricula including seven doctoral degree programs, five Masters Degree programs, and
four Baccalaureate/Associate Degree programs. Id. at 10-11. Southern University in
New Orleans agreed to implement the Masters Degree in Criminal Justice that had
previously been approved by the Board of Regents. Id. at 11-12. Southern University,
New Orleans also agreed to develop and implement Masters Degrees in Transportation,
Substance Abuse, Teaching, and Computer Information Systems. Id. Grambling State
University agreed to develop and implement a Doctoral Degree in Education program,
two Masters Degree programs and four baccalaureate/associate degree programs. Id. at
12-13.
229. Id. at 16.
230. Id. at 16-17. Louisiana State University, the flagship historically white college,
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university in the system agreed to "develop a comprehensive
program for recruitment and retention of other-race students,
faculty, administrators, and staff." 231
Finally, the Louisiana
Settlement Agreement required each university within the system to
create and develop a program to recruit and retain other-race
students, faculty, administrators, and staff. 232
C. Student Retention and Persistence as the Measure of Success
Statistics suggest that the retention rates for white students in
college tend to be higher than retention rates of African-American
students. 233 The trial court's findings in Ayers v. Fordice support the
truthfulness of this statement. 234 A successful desegregation plan
must not only focus on access to equal educational opportunity but
must also make student retention and student persistence the focus
of its measure of achieving success. Just as student persistence is the
indicator of the individual's success and performance, 235 student
retention is the indicator of the institution's success and
performance. 236 Each is a measurable outcome. Research also
shows that there exists a direct proportional relationship between
retention and a student's academic ability. 237
Moreover, the
student's ability to persist from the first to the second year is one of

and Southern University agreed to structure undergraduate and graduate degree
programs to encourage graduates of the respective institutions to enter graduate degree
programs at the accepting institution as "other-race" students.

231. Id. at 20-22.
232. Id. at 23-24.
233. See, e.g., Ayers v. Fordice, No. 4:75CV009-B-O, 1995 WL 1945428, at *44 (N.D.

Miss. Mar. 7, 1995).
234. Id.
235. Randi S. Levitz, Lee Noel & Beth J. Richter, Strategic Moves for Retention Success,
108 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR HIGHER EDUC. 31 (1999).
"Student persistence to the
completion of educational goals is a key indicator of student satisfaction and success....
If information on students' goals is collected, preferably at the beginning of each

[academic] term, then whether an individual student persists to the completion of his or
her educational goals can be measured." Id.

236. According to Levitz:
Retention...

is not the primary goal [of the university], but it is the best

indicator that an institution is meeting its goal of student satisfaction and
success. It is a measure of how much student growth and learning takes place,
how valued and respected students feel on campus, and how effectively the
campus delivers what students expect, need, and want. When these conditions
are met, students find a way to stay in school, despite external financial and
personal pressures. In sum, retention is a measure of overall "product."

Id. at 31-32.
237. Id. at 33.
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the most important factors influencing the institution's graduation
rate. 238 In general, in national graduation statistics, Mississippi and
Louisiana rank well below the top ranked states reporting six year
graduation statistics for four-year institutions. 239 In both states, six
year graduation rates at the historically black institutions tend to lag
behind historically white institutions, but tend to be somewhat
240
similar to institutions within their same Carnegie Classification.
Six year graduation rates for African-American students at the
historically white colleges in both states tend to be lower than those
of white students. 241 As a matter of sound educational policy and
238. Id. at 35-36.
239. Six year graduation statistics for the state of Mississippi were at 41% in 1992 and
51% for 2006 in contrast with the state of Louisiana where the six year graduation
statistics were 33% in 1992 and 39% in 2006. The National Center For Public Policy And
Higher Education, Measuring Up 2006: The State Report Card on Higher Education,
Mississippi, at 10, available at http://measuringup.highereducation.org (select "State
Reports"; then select "Download State Report Cards in pdf"; then select "2006" and
"Mississippi"); The National Center For Public Policy And Higher Education, Measuring
Up 2006: The State Report Card on Higher Education, Louisiana, at 10, available at
http://measuringup.highereducation.org (select "State Reports"; then select "Download
State Report Cards in pdf"; then select "2006" and "Louisiana"). The top ranked states
in 2006 reported six year graduation statistics of 64%. Id.
240. The Education Trust, College Results Online, http://www.collegeresults.org
(follow "Enter College Results Online" hyperlink; then follow "Customized Search by
Institution/Student Characteristics" hyperlink; then search for 6-year graduation rates
over time for the years 1997 through 2004). The 1997-2004 six-year graduation rates at
Louisiana's historically black colleges were (Carnegie Classification indicated in
parenthesis): Grambling State University (Master's Medium), 37.7%; Southern
University (Master's Large), Baton Rouge 26.6%; and Southern University (Master's
Medium), New Orleans, 11.7%. Id. The 1997-2004 six-year college graduation rates at
Louisiana's historically white colleges were: Louisiana State University (Research, Very
High), Baton Rouge, 55.8%; Louisiana Tech University (Doctoral/Research), 51.5%;
University of Louisiana, Lafayette (Research High), 32.3%; Northwestern State
University (Master's Large), 31.1%; McNeese State University (Master's Large), 29.4%;
University of Louisiana (Master's Large), Monroe 27.3%; Nicholls State University
(Master's Medium), 26.6%; Southeastern Louisiana University (Master's Large), 25.3%;
University of New Orleans (Research High), 24.5%; Louisiana State University (Master's
Id. The 1997-2004 six-year graduation rates at
Medium), Shreveport, 13.3%.
Mississippi's historically black colleges were: Alcorn State University (Master's
Medium), 42.7%; Mississippi Valley State University (Master's Small), 40.5%; Jackson
State University (Research High), 39.7%. Id. The 1997-2004 six-year graduation rates for
the historically white colleges were: Mississippi State University (Research High), 57.7%;
University of Mississippi(Research High), 54.4%; University of Southern Mississippi
(Research High), 48%;and Mississippi University for Women (Master's Small), 36.9%. Id.
See also Alexander C. McCormick & Chun-Mei Zhao, Rethinking and Reframing The
CarnegieClassification, 37 CHANGE No. 5 50 (Sept./Oct. 2005).
241. The Education Trust, College Results Online, http://www.collegeresults.org
(follow "Enter College Results Online" hyperlink; then follow "Customized Search by
Institution/Student Characteristics" hyperlink; then search for 6-year graduation rates
over time for the years 1997 through 2004). The 1997-2004 six-year graduation rates for
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service to the citizenry of the states, both desegregation plans
represented an opportunity to address the academic aspects of
retention toward the ultimate goal of increasing the six-year
graduation rates for not only for African-American students, but for
all students enrolled in the state universities. The Mississippi
Settlement Agreement addressed the academic component of
retention; however, the Louisiana plan was inadequate in this
respect.
Prior to the 1995 remedial order in Ayers each of the eight
public universities in Mississippi offered remedial course work as a
means to supplement students who were deficient in some area of
core freshman study. 242 Judge Biggers' 1995 order eliminated the
greater portion of these remedial courses and substituted an intense
summer developmental program. 243 Judge Biggers found that
African-American student retention rates were lower than those of
white students system-wide. 244 As a response, he adopted the
African American students (AA) compared to white students (W) at the historically
white colleges in Louisiana were: Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge (AA, 44.6%,
W, 57.1%); Louisiana Tech University (AA, 35%, W, 54.3%); Northwestern State
University (AA, 23.5%, W, 34.5%); University of New Orleans (AA, 20.3%, W, 26%);
University of Louisiana, Monroe (20.3%, W, 31%); University of Louisiana, Lafayette
(AA, 19.9%, W, 36.6%); McNeese State University (AA, 19.3%,W, 31.9%); Southeastern
Louisiana University (AA, 18.6%, W, 26.5%); Nicholls State University (AA, 9.7%, W,
31.1%); Louisiana State University, Shreveport (AA 7.9%, W, 14.6%). Id. The 1997-2004
six-year graduation rates for African American students (AA) compared to white
students (W) at the historically white colleges in Mississippi were: Delta State University
(AA, 44.6%, W, 47.3%); Mississippi State University (AA 44.4%, W, 61.6%); University of
Southern Mississippi (AA 41.6%, White, 50.5%); and Mississippi University For Women
(AA, 32.5%, W, 36.7%). Id.
242. Ayers v. Fordice, 111 F. 3d 1183, 1201 (5th Cir. 1997) (discussing previous
arrangement for providing remedial education).
243. The Court of Appeals ordered a remand on the propriety of the elimination of
the remedial courses at Mississippi universities. Id. at 1202, 1228.
244. Judge Biggers reported the following statistics in his opinion respecting retention
rates for white students and African American students measuring from the 1985
academic year through 1991: 47.7% white students entering college in the 1985 academic
year graduated after four years, while only 29.4% African American students entering
college in 1985 graduated after four years. The opinion also stated that retention and
graduation rates for African American students were higher in the historically white
universities. The respective African American/white student retention rates for specific
universities within the system measuring from the 1985 academic year were: Alcorn
State University, 27.2% African American, 62.5% white; Jackson State University, 27.3%
African American, 11.1% white; Mississippi Valley State University, 24.1% African
American, 48.8% white; Mississippi State University, 37.3% African American, 52.4%
white; University of Mississippi, 42.1% African American, 48.8% white; University of
Southern Mississippi, 39.7% African American, 40.3% white; Delta State University,
34.7% African American, 47.3% white; Mississippi University for Women, 40% African
American, 41.5% white. Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. 1419, 1469, 1470 n.253 (N.D. Miss.
1995).
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Board of Trustees uniform admissions program that provided for a
spring placement process for high school seniors, coupled with a
summer developmental program for qualifying students. 245 The
subsequent Agreement in Ayers did not abandon the focus on
retention initiatives.
It provided for the maintenance and
implementation of a summer developmental education program
that had been established under a prior Consent Decree. 246 The
program offered summer preparation for any student who sought
admission to a Mississippi college or university, but whose
indicators suggested that the student might be at risk respecting the
247
student's ability to successfully matriculate at the university.
Much of the student-oriented text in the Louisiana Settlement
Agreement focused on the financial aspect of recruiting and
retaining other-race students, to the detriment of a more balanced
approach, which should have also focused on the academic
implications of retention. 248 According to the text of the Agreement,
each university's plan of implementation had to include provisions
for other-race admissions officers, equal opportunity statements,
public information efforts, developing relationships between high
schools and colleges, and other-race scholarships for graduate
students. 249 The Agreement's limited requirements for academic
retention efforts permitted each university to choose whether to
address these issues in its individual plan of implementation.2 50 The
reports of the Monitoring Committee reflected this shortcoming. In
each of the ten yearly reports, the Monitoring Committee addressed
the recruitment efforts of the various state universities but none of
251
the reports revealed implementation of any retention programs.
245. Id. at 1478.
246. Id.

In 1995, Judge Biggers ordered adoption of the Board of Trustees' 1995

admissions standards for admission to Mississippi colleges. Id. at 1478, 1494. The new
admission standards eliminated the existence of open admission for any Mississippi
university and provided spring evaluations of high school seniors who failed to qualify
for admission under the regular admission standards. Id. at 1478. If students passed the

spring academic screening process, they would be admitted to the university. Id. If a
student's performance on the academic screening test was unsatisfactory, a summer

development program was available to bridge gaps between a student's high school
preparation and skills needed for success in the freshman year. Id. at 1478-79. The 2001
Agreement ordered Board of Trustee funding for the summer developmental program
in the amounts of $500,000 for fiscal years 2002-2006 and $750,000 for fiscal years 20072011. Mississippi Settlement Agreement, supra note 34, at 4-5. These appropriations are
designated for use by students who qualify for admission to the summer developmental

program. Id.
247. Ayers, 879 F. Supp. at 1478.
248. 1994 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, supra note 177, at 20-22.
249. Id.
250. Id.

251. Ninth

Annual

Evaluation

of the

Desegregation Settlement

Agreement,
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However, respecting the two geographic proximate state law
schools in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, the Agreement contained
specific requirements concerning retention efforts. 252 LSU Law
Center, the historically white institution, was required to create and
implement a plan for recruiting and retaining more AfricanAmerican students. 253
Southern University Law Center, the
historically black institution, agreed to provide academic support
25 4
activities for students at risk for attrition.
Implementation of the Settlement Agreement at 37-39, United States v. State of
Louisiana, No. 80-3300A (May 2004) [hereinafter Ninth Annual Evaluation]; Eighth
Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the
Settlement Agreement at 33-35, United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A (May
2003) [hereinafter Eighth Annual Evaluation]; Seventh Annual Evaluation of the
Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement at
29-31, United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A (May 2002) [hereinafter Seventh
Annual Evaluation]; Sixth Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement
Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement at 29-31, United States v. State
of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A (May 2001) [hereinafter Sixth Annual Evaluation]; Fifth
Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the
Settlement Agreement at 32-34, United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A (May
2000) [hereinafter Fifth Annual Evaluation]; Fourth Annual Evaluation of the
Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement at
29-30, United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A (May 1999) [hereinafter Fourth
Annual Evaluation]; Third Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement
Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement at 32-33, United States v. State
of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A (May 1998) [hereinafter Third Annual Evaluation]; Second
Annual Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the
Settlement Agreement at 27-29, United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A (May
1997)
[hereinafter Second Annual Evaluation]; First Annual Evaluation of the
Desegregation Settlement Agreement, Implementation of the Settlement Agreement at
18-19, United States v. State of Louisiana, No. 80-3300A (May 1996) [hereinafter First
Annual Evaluation].
252. 1994 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, supra note 177, at 19.
253. Id. The Agreement was to contain: admissions exceptions for applicants with
reasonable likelihood of success in academic programs; a comprehensive plan for
contacting potential applicants; significant financial assistance; a special admissions
officer responsible for recruitment, and pre-enrollment preparatory programs. Id. The
LSU plan was implemented effective the 1995-1996 academic- year. See First Annual
Evaluation, supra note 251, at 14-16. The reports of the Monitoring Committee
acknowledged improved retention rates at LSU Law Center for African-American
students since the implementation of the Settlement Agreement.
Ninth Annual
Evaluation, supra note 251, at 34. For the reporting year 1999 through 2002, LSU Law
Center reported retention rates for first year students: 1) 1999, African-American
students, 61%, all first year students, 79%; 2) 2000, African-American students, 82%, all
first year students 82%; 3) African American students, 74%, all first year students, 88%;
4) 2002, African-American students, 83%, all first year students, 92%. Id. LSU Law
Center implemented and continues to maintain a Pre-Law Legal Methods Program for
all students considered at risk for first year attrition. Id. at 33.
254. 1994 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, supra note 177, at 20. In accordance with
Agreement requirements, Southern University Law Center implemented an academic
support program for students effective the 1993-1994 academic year. First Annual
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D. The Community College System as a Component of Equal
Educational Opportunity
A key component to developing and implementing an effective
higher education desegregation plan requires states to increase
access to their institutions. Community colleges can serve this
function well. However, under prior de jure systems of higher
education, community colleges were not used towards this end,
thus not realizing their full potential. Effectively, they were a shield,
a tracking mechanism protecting some institutions in the higher
education system from desegregation. 255 A comprehensive and
effective desegregation plan, however, uses the community college
system in a manner that recognizes it as a full partner, a sword in
the desegregation effort. The community college can achieve its
place in fulfilling access to equal educational opportunity, if it is
organized to foster easy articulation between the system's two-year
colleges and four-year institutions. And if true student choice is
fostered rather than the creation of an institutional tracking system
whose purpose is to divert African-American students away from
four-year colleges, then the community college has the potential to
become a full participant in the equal educational opportunity
project. 256
When the Louisiana case was originally filed in 1974, there was
Three
no separate state-wide community college system. 257
community colleges were named as defendants in the lawsuit, but
there was no "system" to name as a defendant or to address
remedially. 258 Nevertheless, recognizing the need to remediate the
Evaluation, supra note 251, at 16. For the 1995-1996 reporting year, Southern University
Law Center's Academic Assistance Program consisted of a Pre-Law Summer Program
open to students considered at risk for attrition during the first year; an Academic
Assistance Program during first year of law school for all students irrespective of at-risk
status; and an Academic Counseling Service. Id.
255. S.EDUC. FouND., supra note 190, at 30. Twelve states, formerly operating dual
systems of education, had community colleges systems which were largely populated by
minority students because of the institution's lower admission standards. Id. Statistics
for first time, full time freshman African-American students enrolled in two-year
institutions in 1991 were: Alabama, 56%; Florida, 78 %;Georgia, 45%; Kentucky, 28%;
Louisiana 25%; Maryland, 40%; Mississippi, 58%; North Carolina, 37%; Pennsylvania,
33%; Tennessee, 37%; Texas, 39%; Virginia, 21%. Id.
256. See id. (noting concern regarding rates of transfer between two and four-year
colleges).
257. United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 499, 503 (E. D. La. 1989).
258. Id. One community college was named as an original defendant and two others
were subsequently named as defendants in amended complaints. See United States v.
Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. 642, 645, 647 (E. D. La. 1988) (stating that Delgado Community
College was named as defendant in original suit and Bossier Community College
(BPCC) and St. Bernard Parish Community College (SBPCC) were named as defendants
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state's significant high school drop-out rate as well as the need to
increase accessibility to four-year colleges, Judge Schwartz's 1989
remedial order mandated the establishment of a community college
system in the state. 2 9 However, the Fifth Circuit's subsequent 1990
decision in Ayers required Judge Schwartz to grant summary
judgment for all Louisiana defendants and vacate his prior remedial
order which included the creation of the community college
system. 260
When the parties drafted their 1994 Settlement
Agreement, post-Fordice, they saw no need to incorporate the
community college desegregation partnering plan as broadly as had
been defined by Judge Schwartz in his 1989 order and Judge
Schwartz approved the Agreement without its inclusion. 261 The
final 1994 plan partnered with the community college in its fouryear college desegregation effort, but only to a very limited extent.
The plan required only the creation of a community college in Baton
Rouge in an effort to foster better retention and matriculation at the
four year colleges in the area. 262 This narrow community college
in amended complaints). At the time, both institutions were supervised by the Board of
Elementary and Secondary Education (BESE) and the Bossier Parish School Board
(BPSB). Id. at 658. In 1988, the trial court granted summary judgment to BESE and BPSB
on the issue of liability because neither of the community colleges under their
supervision had any "history of segregation and [no evidence was produced to prove
that they] have operated on anything but a fully integrated basis and their supervising
boards, which [were] wholly separate from Louisiana's four higher education boards,
[had] discriminated in any fashion against minorities." Id. at 658.
259. United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. at 510, 518. The trial court ordered the
creation of a system of community colleges with open admissions standards. Id. at 518.
The community college system was to incorporate the existing community colleges
organized under one Board. Id. By the 1993-94 academic year, the community colleges
were to assume all responsibility for higher education remedial programming, thereby
eliminating remedial educational programming from all four-year institutions. Id. at
518.
260. See United States v. Louisiana, 751 F. Supp. 606, 608 (E.D. La. 1990); see also
United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 499; Ayers v. Allain, 914 F. 2d. 676 (5th Cir.
1990).
261. The Louisiana State legislature ultimately provided the vehicle through which a
community college system was created. See S. 1, 1998 Leg., 1st Extraordinary Sess.
(1998). S. 2, 1998 Leg., 1st Extraordinary Sess. (1998) (providing for a voter initiative to
amend the Louisiana State Constitution to create a community college system); see also
Regents Chief Lauds Voter Backing on Education, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 23, 1998, at B4; Ed
Anderson, Community College Plan Top Amendment on Ballot 18 Changes Proposed For State
Constitution, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 23, 1998, at A3; Ed Anderson, Foster Quietly Signs
Community College Bill, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 8, 1998, at A3.
262. 1994 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, supra note 177, at 8-9. The Agreement
required the community college's curriculum to emphasize: remedial education courses
to prepare academically disadvantaged students for the opportunity to pursue
baccalaureate and higher programs at other institutions. Id. at 9. Additionally, the
Agreement required an articulation agreement between the community college and the
four-year institutions. Id. The Baton Rouge Community College was established
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focus suggests that parties can, in fact, settle within narrower
constitutional parameters, than might be identified by a judicially
crafted remedy.
The Mississippi Settlement Agreement is totally lacking in
community college desegregation partnering. Although Mississippi
has a substantial community college system, 263 the parties declined
to include its community college system in its desegregation effort.
The previous 1995 remedial order in Ayers recognized the value of
the community college system as a co-partner in desegregation
problem solving, but the final Agreement contained no collaborative
coordination between community colleges and the state's four-year
institutions. 264 The failure represents a missed opportunity to foster
better retention and improved graduation statistics at the state's
four-year institutions.
E. The Historically Black College as an Integral Part of a Diverse
System of Higher Education: Merger and Closure as a Last
Resort
Tension exists between the historically black college as an
integral part of a diverse system of higher education and the Fordice
standard that to dismantle a prior de jure system of higher education
a state must eliminate all vestiges of segregation. The words of
Justice White in Fordice ring loud and clear respecting the remedial
relief sought by the private plaintiffs in the case:
If we understand private petitioners to press us to order the
upgrading of Jackson State, Alcorn State, and Mississippi Valley
State solely so that they may be publicly financed, exclusively
black enclaves by private choice, we reject that request. The State
pursuant to La. R. S. 17: 3222 in 1995 and opened with the beginning of the 1998-1999
academic year. See Baton Rouge Community College Foundation, Quick Facts,
http://www.brcc.cc.la.us/foundation/facts.php.
The institution has an open
admissions policy as mandated by the Settlement Agreement. 1994 Louisiana
Settlement Agreement, supra note 177, at 4. It provides transfer degree programs with
the Associate of Liberal Arts, Associate of General Studies and the Associate of Science
in General Science degrees. Ninth Annual Evaluation, supra note 251, at 18.
263. See IHL Miss. Bd. of Tr. of State Inst. of Higher Learning, Miss. Pub. Univ.,
http://www.ihl.state.ms.us/cjc/; see also Mississippi Settlement Agreement, supra note
34.
264. Ayers, 879 F. Supp. at 1475-76 (stating that "the State, it appears is losing a
valuable resource in not coordinating the admissions requirements and remedial
programs between the community colleges and the universities. Such coordination has
not been proposed to the court, but the court will direct the Board to study this area and
report to the Monitoring Committee."). Id.
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provides these facilities for all its citizens and it has not met its
burden under Brown to take affirmative steps to dismantle its
system when it perpetuates a separate, but "more
prior de jure
equal" one. 265
Justice White's admonition might sound like the death knell for
historically black colleges, but his words must be understood in
context.
Whether all universities within a system of higher
education can continue to exist requires a careful evaluation of the
general principle of Fordice. Within the Fordice analysis, it must be
considered whether the racial identifiability of universities within a
system, is a vestige of the prior de jure system, thereby channeling
student choice and continuing the prior de jure effect. If so, there
must be a determination as to whether the continued existence of all
universities within the system is educationally justifiable. Closure
or merger of any racially identifiable institution is not a required
Fordice remedy if its continued existence is educationally
266
justifiable.
Politically and fiscally, however, historically black colleges and
universities are particularly vulnerable under the "educationally
justifiable" portion of the Fordice analysis. Years of inequitable state
funding for hiring faculty, capital improvements, and competitive
programmatic offerings hampered the educational competitiveness
of historically black colleges. 267 Inadequate funding also had an
effect on student teacher ratio in the classroom, as well as the ability
of the institutions to effectively recruit the best students. 26s With
these factors in mind, a sound, fair and equitable desegregation plan
should not expect historically black institutions to bear the full brunt
of desegregation remedial orders through their merger and
closure. 269 Neither the Louisiana nor the Mississippi Settlement
265. United States v. Fordice, 505 U. S.717, 743 (1992) (emphasis added).
266. Id. at 743 (determining that the fact that "an institution is predominantly white or
black does not in itself make out a constitutional violation").
267. Responding to the Needs of Historically Black Colleges and Universities:Hearing Before
the H. Subcomm. on 21st Century Competitiveness and the H. Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the
Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 107th Cong. 10 (2002) (opening statement of Rep.
Robert Scott); Id. at 39-41 (statement of Michael Lomax on capital improvement and
funding problems of HBCUs); LORENZO MORRIS, ELUSIVE EQUALITY: THE STATUS OF
BLACK AMERICANS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 193-98 (1979).
268. See FRANK BOWLES & FRANK A. DECOSTA, BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: A PROFILE OF

NEGRO HIGHER EDUCATION 235 (1971) (noting poor conditions in black colleges and
universities with respect to education); see generally Responding to the Needs of
Historically Black Colleges and Universities, supra note 267; see also Michael Nettles et.
al, Student Retention and Progression: A Special Challenge for Private Historically Black
Colleges and Universities, in PROMISING PRACTICES IN RECRUITMENT, REMEDIATION, AND
RETENTION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 52 (Gerald H. Gaither ed., 1999).

269. In Fordice,Justice Thomas speaks to the educational value of the historically black
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Agreement resulted in the closure of any historically black
institution. Whether the plans have resulted in "black enclaves by
private choice" or institutions which are now "just universities,"
requires a critique. Some theorize that the very existence of the
historically black college is antithetical to the existence of a unitary
system of higher education. 270 If Brown said that "separate is
inherently unequal," the logic follows that a Plessy created
historically black school would be an unconstitutional entity. To the
contrary, the existence of historically black universities within a
system of higher education is no more unconstitutional than is the
existence of historically white universities. Rather, the question is
whether the state's current policies are deeply "rooted in prior
officially segregated system[s] that serve to maintain the racial
identifiability of its universities [and whether those policies] can
practicably be eliminated without eroding sound educational
policies. " 271 Having been transformed through the lens of Fordice,
historically black colleges can command their rightful place as part
of an array of higher educational choices offered by the state.
A proper focus on the Fordice construct suggests that those
drafting the Louisiana and Mississippi plans should have been
extremely hesitant to consider merger or closure as a viable remedy
college in a concurring opinion:
[Historically black colleges] have succeeded in part because of their distinctive
histories and traditions; for many, historically black colleges have become "a
symbol of the highest attainments of black culture."... Obviously, a State
cannot maintain such traditions by closing particular institutions, historically
white or historically black, to particular racial groups. Nonetheless, it hardly
follows that a State cannot operate a diverse assortment of institutionsincluding historically black institutions-open to all on a race-neutral basis, but
with established traditions and programs that might disproportionately appeal
to one race or another. No one, I imagine would argue that such institutional
diversity is without sound educational justification, or that it is even remotely
akin to program duplication, which is designed to separate the races for the sake
of separating the races.
Fordice, 505 U.S. at 748-9 (Thomas, J., concurring).
270. See Robert Davis, Diversity: The Emerging Modern Separate But Equal Doctrine, 1
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 11, 49-51 (1994) (characterizing Fordice as "[holding] open
the separate but equal door.., to provide educational justifications for maintaining
[racially identifiable] institutions for the sake of diversity."). But see, Wendy Scott
Brown, Race Consciousness in Higher Education:Does "Sound EducationalPolicy" Support the
Continued Existence of Historically Black Colleges?, 43 EMORY L. J. 1, 17-8 (1994)
(challenging the notion that historically black colleges can not survive after Fordice).
Professor Scott Brown suggests that a proper conceptualization of the Brown mandate of
equal educational opportunity, as interpreted by Fordice, centers the discussion on the
needs of African-American students and the Black community, thus harmonizing the
tension between the development of sound educational policies and the achievement of
equal educational opportunity. Id.
271. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 743 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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for resolving lingering effects of prior discrimination. A truly
progressive and effective desegregation plan in both states should
have accounted for the successes the historically black institutions
experienced despite the disparities in funding they lacked. The
settlement processes in both states reflect these considerations. Both
plans valued the contribution of their respective historically black
institutions by defining their institutional missions consistent with
Fordice, thereby exposing the institutions' educational justifiability
and eliminating the necessity of mergers or closures. Once the de
jure segregative missions of the institutions were properly deconstructed, all of the retained institutions and programs necessarily
required enhancement.
At this juncture, the Mississippi and
Louisiana historically black colleges could join as full partners in
joint and cooperative relationships with other universities within
the states' respective higher education systems. Hence, their
272
educational justification was fulfilled.
The Louisiana Settlement Agreement was very interesting
concerning the question of the maintenance of its historically black
colleges as important constituents in a diverse assortment of
institutions within its system of higher education. Under the terms
of the Settlement Agreement, the court retained jurisdiction in order
to enforce the terms of the agreement. 273 The court was not
authorized to order "any remedial action different from that set
forth in the Settlement Agreement." 274 A careful analysis of the
Agreement, however, reveals a requirement that the Fordice
275
formulary was to be applied to the program duplication factor.
Therefore, if the system is found out of compliance with the Fordice
standard respecting program duplication, the court has the power to
design its own remedy for compliance. Until the district court
releases the system from oversight, a merger remedy like the one
previously proposed but rejected by Judge Schwartz, is still
available to the court, irrespective of the terms of the Agreement.
In crafting the 1989 Master Plan for desegregation in Louisiana,
the Special Master focused on program duplication in evaluating the
presence of two state-supported law schools in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana as a target for remedial action. This was three years
ahead of the Supreme Court's identification of the factor as relevant
in Fordice.276 The Special Master identified the duplicate programs
272. S. EDUC. FOUND., supra note 190, at xvii (suggesting advancements in black
institutions to enhance education levels).

273. 1994 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, supra note 177, at 30-31.
274. See id. at 31.
275. See id.
276. United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 499, 513-514 (E. D. La. 1989). The Special

Masters Report stated:
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as a vestige of the prior de jure system and the remedy selected and
ultimately adopted by the court was the merger of Southern
University Law Center into the LSU Law Center with the LSU Law
Center as the surviving institution. 277 This proposal of merger is an
example of a common perception of the effects of desegregation
remedies stemming from the elementary and secondary cases, as
well as the higher education context. The criticism is a simple one
evolving from desegregation efforts during the early years of Brown
implementation which recognizes that the "costs and burdens of
desegregation [were] often disproportionately borne by AfricanAmerican communities." 278 In this light, the loss of a professional
school as a result of the Southern/LSU merger would be an even
greater reminder the early post-Brown years. 279 This merger remedy
became the lightening rod for a very contentious debate between the
In cataloguing the problems associated with unwarranted duplication of
programs, legal education in Louisiana looms large. There are two state
supported law schools in Louisiana, Southern Law Center and the LSU Paul
Hebert Law, both located in Baton Rouge. In terms of racial identifiability and
academic achievement, they present remarkably different pictures. Southern
Law Center is desegregated, with a student body 58 percent black and 42
percent white and a faculty, which is virtually 50/50. LSU Law Center on the
other hand has a minuscule percentage of black students during the period of
the Settlement Agreement, it ranged from 1.9% to 0.8%. In 1988, it was only
three percent. Moreover, the Louisiana bar passage rate at LSU Law Center has
averaged about 90% over the last five years, whereas at Southern Law Center it
is under 50 percent. LSU Law School is a more successful law school from that
perspective, but Louisiana blacks are largely educated at the inferior school. Yet,
competitive, quality legal education for blacks is particularly important because
the ratio because the ratio of black lawyers to the black population is very low,
and law degrees are often recognized as an access point to political and
economic power.
Id. at 513 (emphasis added). The report suggested an affirmative action program of a
"ten percent category of admissions exceptions" in order to "increase the diversity of
LSU Law School," as well as scholarships for black students and serious recruitment
efforts. Id. at 513-14; see also, Susan Finch, DesegregationSaga Spans Four Decades, TIMESPICAYUNE, Dec. 24, 1992, at Al. (chronicling the decades old Louisiana higher education
desegregation case). The trial court appointed Paul Verkuil, then President of the
College of William and Mary, and former Dean of the Law School at Tulane University
Law School, as Special Master in the Louisiana case. Id.
277. United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. at 514. The Special Master reported:
"[Als long as the two institutions of disparate quality exist, the State will continue to
produce a secondary class or lawyers unable to compete fully in the professional
context ....[O]ver the nest five years, the Board must develop a plan of merger of the
two schools." Id. (emphasis added). The court's final order required the merger of
"Southern Law Center into the LSU Law Center." Id. (emphasis added).
278. Alfreda A. Sellers Diamond, Becoming Black in America, 67 MISS. L.J. 427, 458 n.133
(1997).
279. The immediate post-Brown period witnessed the reassignment or dismissal of
scores of black educators. In 1955 it was reported that as many as 6,000 black teachers
and principals were dismissed from public schools in southern states. See id.
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parties because the African-American legal community was
vehemently opposed to it.280 Fortunately, after hearing further
evidence in the matter, the trial court reversed itself on the merger
order. 281 Nevertheless, within the confines of the implementation of
the Agreement, it has become incumbent on Southern University
Law Center to pay particular attention to this Fordice factor, because
it is largely perceived as the "duplicate school."
Like other historically black institutions, the casting of Southern
University Law Center as the "inferior school ...produc[ing second
class lawyers]" by the Special Master and its historical inferior
treatment by the state, continued as a background premise,
producing calls for justification by the school's detractors and
defensive-minded suspicion by its supporters. 2 2 Although the
Fordice question considers the entire. higher education system,
popular perception suggests that the subordinated entity, in this
case Southern University Law Center, would be the most vulnerable
of the two geographically proximate state law schools. Thus,
educational justifiability has become the linchpin of its remedial
focus. The Agreement required Southern University Law Center to
"provide additional opportunities to enhance the skills of at risk
students and to provide opportunities for law school attendance
presently not available in the Baton Rouge area." 283 The state
280. When the merger of the two law schools was originally announce as a remedy,
the Louis A. Martinette Legal Society wrote to the district court incensed with the court's
characterization of Southern University Law Center as "an inferior school that produces
a secondary class of lawyers." John LaPlante, Black Lawyers Liken Judges' Reasoning on
Law School Merger to That of Bigots, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., July 27, 1989, at 1B; John
LaPlante, Judges Get First Formal Bids to Halt Colleges Merger, BATON ROUGE ADVOC.,
Aug. 1, 1989 at 1A; Court Nixes SU Appeal on 1 Board, BATON ROUGE ST. TIMES, Aug. 5,
1989, at 1A. But see Lisa Frazier, La. Rights Group Calls For Universities' Merger, TIMESPICAYUNE, Sept. 22, 1992, at B4; Scott Dyer, Judge Appears To Be Retreating From Merger,
BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Nov. 6, 1992, at 1-2B; Joe Gyan, Jr. Caucus Opposes Closing
Historically Black Colleges, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Dec. 5, 1992, at 9D, 9S.
281. United States v. Louisiana, 811 F. Supp. 1151, 1160 (E. D. La. 1993). The district
court reversed the merger order after receiving evidence that Southern University was
one of the most desegregated institutions in the state's higher education system. Id.
"[T]he evidence submitted to the Court demonstrated that: (1) the school is fully
integrated with a current student racial composition of 53% blacks and 47% whites; (2)
the student/faculty ratio, 17:1, is within acceptable limits; (3) there has been a marked
improvement in the bar passage rate among Southern law students; (4) the library
facilities are in compliance with ABA standards: and (5) the physical facilities are
undergoing extensive renovation." Id. at 1160 n.54.
282. United States v. Louisiana, 718 F.Supp. at X (adopting Special Master's Report as
its order); see also infra Part VI.
283. 1994 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, supra note 177, at 19-20. Respecting
program duplication and program differentiation, the Louisiana Settlement Agreement
required Southern University Law Center to institute a four-year part-time Juris
Doctorate Program. Id. at Appendix H, 11-12. The establishment of this program not
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promised to "(1) improve the quality of [its] physical facilities and
academic offerings; (2) articulate fundamental differences in the
mission of the [two law schools]; [and] (3) increase access to LSU
Law Center." 28 4 With respect to the other historically black
institutions within the Louisiana higher education system, the plan
addressed the program duplication of proximate institutions by
redefining their missions and by implementation of the four-step
plan contained in the Board of Regents 1993 Master Plan. 285
only manages the Fordice factor of program duplication, it also differentiates Southern
University Law Center's mission from that of the Paul M. Hebert Law Center at
Louisiana State University. The implementation history of the Settlement Agreement
over the last nine years suggests that Southern University Law Center will have met its
responsibilities under the Settlement Agreement at the running of the term of the
Settlement Agreement. In 1996, the Monitoring Committee commended Southern
University Law Center's progress in removing its probationary accreditation status with
the American Bar Association. See Second Annual Evaluation, supra note 251, at 27-29.
The Monitoring Committee has made no comments in its Conclusions and
Recommendations on Southern University Law Center's progress under the Settlement
Agreement since 1996. The text of the 1996-1997 Monitoring Committee's report
acknowledges Southern University Law Center's progress with regard to faculty salaries
and faculty hiring, bar examination preparation, curriculum expansion, capital outlay
improvements, and academic assistance for at risk students. Id. Southern University
Law Center has differentiated its program offering from LSU Law Center through the
institution of a part-time day program in 2000 and a part-time evening program in 2004,
thus creating the only state-supported part-time law school offering. Interview with
Elaine Simmons, Registrar, Southern University Law Center in Baton Rouge, Louisiana
(Jan. 22, 2007); see also Catalog, Southern University Law Center, 2006-2008 at 40.
284. 1994 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, supra note 177, at Appendix H, 1.
285. Id. at 17-18. The CIP (Classification of Instruction Programs) is the organizational
classification system used by the National Center for Educational Statistics in collecting,
organizing and reporting survey data. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION
STATISTICS, Classification of Instructional
Programs: 2000, http://nces.ed.gov/
pubs2002/cip2000. There are six categories of Southern Regional Education Board
classifications for four-year universities and colleges and they are very important within
the state's assignment of a university's mission status. S. REGIONAL EDUC. BD., EDUC.
DATA, INST. CATEGORIES, http://www.sreb.org (follow "Post-secondary Education"
hyperlink; then follow "Institutional Categories" hyperlink; then follow "Criteria and
Definitions" hyperlink"). The Four-Year 1 category is the highest ranking; the Four-Year
II University is the second-highest rating, and so on. Id. Under the plan, the state
aspired to move Southern University, Baton Rouge from a Four-Year III University to a
Four-Year II University. 1994 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, supra note 177, at 4. This
goal required Southern University to end its open admissions policy in the year 2000. Id.
The Southern University campus at Shreveport/ Bossier City is a Two-year I College and
it was allowed to maintain its open admissions status under the Settlement Agreement.
Id. at 6. By contrast, Louisiana State University maintained its status as a Four-Year I
institution and the state's flagship university. Id. at 3-4. Under the Agreement,
Grambling State University was a Four-Year IV University and it was allowed to
maintain its open-admissions status under the Settlement Agreement. Id. at 6; see also
Ninth Annual Evaluation, supra note 251, at 5. Southern University, New Orleans is a
Four-V University and it was allowed to maintain its open-admissions status under the
Settlement Agreement. Id. at 5. But see BD. OF REGENTS STATE OF LA., MASTER PLAN FOR
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F. Financial Support for Implementation
The settlement process in Ayers was contentious and resulted in
no unanimous viewpoint on its funding provisions. 286
The
Agreement was one large funding package binding the State of
Mississippi to the terms of the Agreement for another seventeen
years.
Criticisms were numerous: the Agreement was too
expensive; 287 the funding requirements -would restrict the future
choices of state policymakers as to structural changes to the state's
higher education system; 288 the funding decisions within the plan
were the result of a politicization of the litigation process, rather
than the result of sound educational planning; 289 expansion of the
budgets for the historically black colleges supported program
duplication in derogation of the law of Fordice;290 and finally, the
state's fiscal situation in the future might result in an inability to
comply with funding mandates under the plan. 291 The Agreement
was appealed by some of the private plaintiffs, alleging that the
state of Mississippi had not complied with Title VI in its attempts to
dismantle its prior de jure system of higher education. 292 The
appellants' primary criticism of the Agreement was its insufficient
financial support for historically black colleges. 293 Additionally,
appellants were critical of the requirement that ten percent otherPUBLIC POST-SECONDARY EDUC. (2001), available at http://www.regents.state.la.us/
pdfs/Planning/masterplan2001.pdf., regarding Louisiana Board of Regents Master Plan
modification of open admissions status of Grambling State University and Southern
University New Orleans.
286. Ayers v. Musgrove, No. 4:75CV009-B-D, 2002 WL 91895, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 2,
2002). Judge Biggers' opinion reflected the general contentiousness of the Agreement:
"University professors and administrators have testified in favor of the
Proposal . University professors and administrators have testified against the
Proposal. Members of the Mississippi Legislature have testified in favor of the
Proposal. Members of the Mississippi Legislature have testified in opposition
to the Proposal. Education experts from outside the State, with no vested
interest in any of the universities in this State, have testified in favor of and in
opposition to the Proposal. Ordinary citizens of the State who hold no elected
or appointed offices and who are not in the field of education, but who are
interested as citizens and taxpayers, have expressed strong views on the issue."
Id.
287. See id.
288. See id. at *4. For example, should the state of Mississippi decide that it would
want to close or merge institutions based on current fiscal necessity, the Settlement
Agreement in Ayers v. Musgrove would prevent it from doing so until a passage of
seventeen years from the implementation of the Agreement. See id.
289. See id.
290. See id. at *4 n.7.
291. Id. at *4.
292. Ayers v. Thompson, 358 F.3d 356,359-60 (5th Cir. 2004).
293. See id. at 370.
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race student enrollment must be achieved and maintained by the
historically black colleges before the institutions could receive
control of the public endowment. 294 The Fifth Circuit subsequently
determined that the district court had not abused its discretion in
295
approving the Agreement.
Again, the entire focus of the Mississippi Settlement Agreement
was the enhancement of historically black colleges in Mississippi in
order to the create incentives for a greater presence of other-race
students. The Ayers Endowment Trust was created for this express
purpose. 296 Pursuant to the Agreement, if any historically black
college or university "attain[ed] a total head count other-race
enrollment of ten percent and sustain[ed] such a ten percent otherrace enrollment for a period of three consecutive years," that college
or university would assume control of its pro-rata share of the
endowment principal. 297 The Agreement provided funding for the
294. Id.
295. Id. at 376.
296. Id. The Ayers Endowment Trust was created under the settlement and it
provides for $70 million in publicly funded money to be created over a 14-year period.
The income from the public endowment is to be spent by Alcorn State University,
Jackson State University and Mississippi Valley State University for other-race
marketing and recruitment, including employment of other-race recruiting personnel
and award of other-race student scholarships. Mississippi Settlement Agreement, supra
note 34, at 9-10. The Agreement ordered the creation of a $35 million privately funded
endowment to be used by Alcorn State University, Jackson State University and
Mississippi Valley State University for the same purposes as the public endowment. Id.
at 10. A committee staffed by the Presidents of the three historically black colleges,
Commissioner of Higher Education, two Board of Trustee Members, and an additional
designated member manages the Endowment. The Board of Trustees maintains control
of the Endowment until other-race enrollment goals are met by the historically black
colleges. Id. at 9-12. If the targeted enrollment figures are not reached by the 2018, a
yearly evaluation reflecting the good faith efforts to reach the target will allow the
colleges to receive the endowment income. Id. at 11-12.
297. Id. at 10. Once the historically black college attains control over the endowment
principal, it attains the discretion to invest the principal and spend the income for sound
academic purposes such as faculty compensation, academic program enhancements and
student scholarships. Id. Nowhere in the Settlement Agreement, however, do the
parties indicate how they arrived at a 10% other-race enrollment level as a benchmark
for historically black colleges to reach in order to gain control over the principal of the
Ayers Public and Private Endowments. African Americans accounted for 9% of all
students in universities in 1980 and 11% of all students in universities in 2000. NAT'L
CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF EDUC., STATUS AND TRENDS IN THE EDUC. OF

BLACKS 92 (2003), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2003/2003034.pdf. In the 1970s,
the Office of Civil Rights believed that it was important that a state-wide desegregation
plan have as one of its goals an increase in the number of white students attending
historically black colleges. See Revised Criteria Specifying the Ingredients of Acceptable
Plans To Desegregate State Systems of Public Higher Education, 43 Fed. Reg. 32, 6656-64
(Feb. 15, 1978). The parties to the Mississippi Settlement Agreement could have used the
comparable numbers of African-American students on historically white campuses as a
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299
improvement of academic 298 and special summer programs,
capital improvement funding,3 00 special Ayers Funding from the
state legislature spanning a seventeen-year period, 301 and an
302
elevation in status for Jackson State University.
The funding provisions in the Louisiana Settlement Agreement
were obligatory upon the state only for the duration of the
Agreement. Therefore, with the expiration of the Agreement in 2005
came the expiration of all Agreement-mandated funding of its
The funding structure supported
special programs. 303
programmatic enhancements for the historically black colleges, and
it supported other-race graduate scholarships at historically white
colleges as well. 3°4 All funding provisions in these categories which

benchmark for the number of white students to set as a target goal on historically black
campuses. The relative percentage of African-American students at historically white
universities has varied over the last several years from single digit lows at Mississippi
University for Women to well over half the student body at Delta State University:
2002
2003
2004
Delta State University
Mississippi State University
Mississippi University for Women
University of Mississippi
University of Southern Mississippi

54%
23%
4%
15%
32%

57%
24%
4.5%
16%
33%

69%
24%
4.9%
16%
36%

See IHL Miss. Bd. of Tr. of State Institutions of Higher Learning, Miss Pub. Univs., Fall
2006 Enrollment Fact Book & Ten-Year Enrollment Comparison & Selected Information
on Diversity (2006), available at http://www.ihl.state.ms.us (follow "Research &
Planning" hyperlink; then follow "The Fall Enrollment Factbook-2006 Fall Factbook").
Comparatively, white enrollment at the historically black colleges during the same
period did not approach the same percentages. Id.
298. The state promised to spend $246 million for new academic programs at Alcorn
State University, Jackson State University and Mississippi Valley State University. These
programs are mandated to comply with the Fordice requirement of sound educational
justification and the desegregation goals Ayers v. Fordice. Mississippi Settlement
Agreement, supra note 34, at 5-8.
299. This portion of the settlement provides $6.25 million to be spent for qualifying
students to attend summer developmental education classes. Id. at 4-5.
300. The state promised to spend $75 million for new construction and physical
renovations at Alcorn State University, Jackson State University and Mississippi State
University. Id. at 12-14; see Michael A. Fletcher, Mississippi Reaches $500 Million
Settlement in DesegregationCase, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2001, at Al.
301. "[S]pecial Ayers funding" is required for implementation of every facet of the
agreement as well as the funding of the summer developmental programs, academic
programs, public endowment and capital improvements required under the Settlement
Agreement. Mississippi Settlement Agreement, supra note 34, at 14-17.
302. Id. at 17-18. The Settlement Agreement provided that Jackson State University be
designated a "comprehensive university." Id. at 18.
303. See Tenth Annual Evaluation, supra note 32, at i.
304. See 1994 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, supra note 177, at 13-14, 21-22. Under
the Louisiana Agreement, the state legislature committed $48 million in spending for
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have not become self-sustaining are at risk for discontinuance. 305
G. Accountability Measurements and Overall Assessment to Date
The Settlement Agreement in United States v. Louisiana
completed its ten-year term under the supervision of a Monitoring
Committee. 306 The Committee produced ten annual evaluations of
the implementation of the Agreement. 307 The parties to the
Mississippi Settlement Agreement maintain contractual rights to
seek specific performance of the contract pursuant to the terms, but
no independent non-partisan monitor evaluates progress under the
Agreement. The only semblance of an accountability measure is the
annual disclosure provided by the Mississippi Board of Trustees of
State Institutions of Higher Learning to the private plaintiffs and
counsel for the United States. 308 The annual report is a factual
disclosure detailing compliance with the critical portions of the
Agreement.309 It is not evaluative, reflective or critical. As of the
programs in the ten-year plan. The Southern University Board of Supervisors was
allocated $34 million for programmatic enhancement, development and implementation
with an annual allowance of $4.1 million. The University of Louisiana system was
allocated $14 million for programmatic enhancement, development, and implementation
for Grambling State University. Id.
305. The Louisiana higher education system suffered significant budget cuts because
of the significant economic downfall suffered by the state because of Hurricane Katrina.
The full effect of these cuts and their effects on programs implemented under the
Settlement Agreement are not known as of the submission of this article. See id. at 13-17,
20-24, 27. Louisiana lawmakers approved a bill imposing large budget cuts on higher
education. Karin Fischer, Louisiana Legislature Imposes $77-Million in Cuts on State's
Colleges and Students, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 23, 2005. In the Final
Evaluation of the Desegregation Settlement Agreement the Monitors stated:
If Louisiana can continue to fund its institutions of higher education
adequately, and assuming that the equitable patterns of funding established
during the period of the Settlement Agreement are sustained, students will get
good educational opportunities where ever they go .... But there is a
wildcard, and its name was Katrina .... In our judgment, these questions
should not be addressed in evaluating the actions taken under the terms of the
Settlement Agreement.
Final Annual Evaluation, supra note 101, preface.
306. See, e.g., Tenth Annual Evaluation, supra note 32, at i-ii.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 24.
309. Disclosure requirements mandated by the Agreement include disclosure of "line
items" reflecting: "(i) Ayers bond revenues and settlement funds requested; (ii) Ayers
bond revenues and settlement funds obtained; (iii) Ayers bond revenues and settlement
funds expended; (iv) institutional enrollments by race at each public university; (v) by
race and university, the number of participants in the summer program, the number of
participants satisfactorily completing the program, and the number of successful
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completion of this article, only one report has been generated under
the Mississippi Settlement Agreement. 310
The 1994 Louisiana Settlement Agreement differed from its
1981 predecessor in that the 1994 Agreement contained no
numerical goals for proportional enrollment of other-race
enrollment in the historically black and the historically white
institutions. 311
Similarly, the 2001 Mississippi Settlement
Agreement contained no numerical goals but focused on
institutional enhancements and incentives for attracting other-race
students to historically black campuses. 312 The attainment of
specific enrollment numbers was eschewed in both Agreements
because the parties saw them as a hindrance to the successful
implementation of a plan. Since the standard for performance
under both Agreements hinges on a determination of substantial
performance, a challenge to a defendant's performance is not
definable with any numerical precision. As long as no party to the
agreement complains, the racial identifiability of many of the
participants enrolling in the following fall term; (vi) by race and university, the number
of persons receiving funding pursuant to section II of this Agreement, the total amount
of funding received by each university and the standards used in distributing the funds;
(vii) by university, the facilities projects receiving funding under section V of this
Agreement, together with identification of those projects completed; (viii) by university,
the academic programs receiving funding under section VI(b) of this Agreement; and
(ix) the amount of private endowment raised and the amounts of public and private
endowment income distributed to each university pursuant to section IV of this
Agreement. Such annual disclosures will address the specified items regarding the
immediately preceding fiscal year and will also include a cumulative summary of such
items to date." Mississippi Settlement Agreement, supra note 34, at 24. Judge Biggers'
previous remedial order of 1995 established a three-person committee charged with
oversight of implementation. He later reduced the committee to a single monitor
responsible for supervising implementation of the court's order. Ayers v. Thompson,
358 F.3d 356, 361 n.6 (5th Cir. 2004).
310. See Bd. of Trustees, Institutions of Higher Learning St. of Miss., AYERS
ACCOUNTABILITY MANUAL, Sept. 15, 2005.
311. Compare 1981 Louisiana Consent Decree, supra note 201, at 3-4 (stating: (1) "the
proportion of black high school graduates throughout the state who enter public
institutions of higher education shall be equal to the proportion of white high school
graduates throughout the State who enter such institutions," thus closing a 6.5%
statewide differential; (2) the "proportion of qualified black Louisiana residents who
graduate from undergraduate institutions in the state system and enter state graduate or
professional schools shall be equal to the proportion of qualified white state residents
who graduate from state institutions and enter state graduate an professional schools;"
(3) Southern University in Baton Rouge and New Orleans as well as Grambling State
University were to achieve a white student enrollment of 13.5% by 1987-1988; (4)
Louisiana State University in Baton was to achieve an African American student
enrollment of 18% by 1987-1988) with 1994 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, supra note
177, at 20-22 ("Each state institution shall develop a comprehensive program for
recruitment and retention of other-race students.").
312. Mississippi Settlement Agreement, supra note 34, passim.
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institutions in both states can remain with a wink and a nod of the
parties. In addition, the aggressive Department of Justice that
instituted the Title VI enforcement against the states in the 1960s has
been replaced by one that is motivated to clear these cases from the
docket.313

The Louisiana Monitoring Committee's tenth report confirms
that many important Settlement Agreement initiatives were
accomplished. New program implementation at historically black
colleges has resulted in the award of 603 degrees during the ten-year
period. 314 Historically black colleges awarded more than $750,000 in
other-race scholarships. 315
However, all historically black
universities within the system reported very low numbers of otherrace students actually enrolled. 316
Other-race scholarships at
historically white universities resulted in the award of ninety-seven
doctoral degrees during the term of the Agreement. 317 Most capital
outlay projects promised under the Agreement projects were
completed. 318 Program duplication review by the State Board of
Regents was completed during the term of the Agreement, resulting
in ninety-six programs in the system being merged, consolidated, or
terminated. 319 Program enhancements at the state's historically
black colleges were completed during the term of the Settlement
Agreement.320 As mandated by the Agreement, the Louisiana State
Board of Regents completed a full evaluation of program
duplication in 2001 as part of the plan to end open admissions in
four year institutions. 321
Open admissions for all four-year
313. HALPERN, supra note 125.
314. Tenth Annual Evaluation, supra note 32, at i.
315. See id. (specifying scholarships were to SUBR and SUNO).

316. See id. at 16 (providing statistical chart of "other" race students from 1995
through 2004 attending Louisiana universities).
317. See id. at i.
318. See id.

319. Second Annual Evaluation, supra note 251, at 19.

Statewide, seventy-nine

programs were terminated and fifty programs were targeted for collaborative liaison
between campuses. Id. The Settlement Agreement mandated the maintenance of
current programs, and the development of new "joint, dual and cooperative" programs

between Louisiana State University and Southern University in Baton Rouge, New
Orleans and Shreveport. See 1994 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, supra note 177, at 1617. These programs were successfully developed during the Settlement Agreement.

Tenth Annual Evaluation, supra note 32, at i; see Second Annual Evaluation, supra note
251, at 1, 27.
320. See 1994 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, supra note 177, at 10-13 and Tenth
Annual Evaluation, supra note 32, at i. Only one program targeted for development was
abandoned. Id.
321. See BD. OF REGENTS STATE OF LA., MASTER PLAN FOR PUBLIC POST-SECONDARY

EDUCATION, (2001),
masterplan2001.pdf.

available at http://www.regents.state.

la.us/pdfs/Planning/
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institutions will end in 2010 when Grambling State University and
Southern University in New Orleans, two historically black colleges,
will be the last four-year institutions to institute selective admissions
requirements. 39
Significant aspirational goals under the Louisiana Settlement
Agreement, however, were not met. Although the state provided
funds for historically black colleges in Baton Rouge and New
Orleans to improve their Southern Regional Education Board
classification during the ten-year term of the Agreement, this goal
was not met. 323 The Agreement provided funding incentives for
other-race student enrollment and employment rather than setting
numeric goals in these areas. 324 Unfortunately, across the ten-year
period, the numbers of entering freshman percentages in
universities with selective admissions requirements in many
institutions remained largely unchanged. 325 The employment
statistics have also remained relatively unchanged. 326
322. After the Board of Regents four step review, the decision was made to eliminate
all open admissions requirements in four year institutions. See id. at 25-26, 42, 50. Under
the original terms of the Settlement Agreement, Grambling State University was allowed
to retain its open admissions policy. 1994 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, supra note
177, at 6. The question left open by the end of open admissions in four-year colleges in
Louisiana is whether this will negatively impact African-American student access to
four year institutions. Douglas Laycock, The Broader Case for Affirmative Action:
Desegregation, Academic Excellence, and Future Leadership, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1767, 1783-84
(2004). See generally; Alfred Dennis Mathewson, The Picture of Equality, 16 U. FLA. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 299 (2005).
323. 1994 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, supra note 177, at 3-5; Tenth Annual
Evaluation, supra note 32, passim. Geographically proximate, historically white and
historically black institutions maintained specific missions under the Louisiana
Agreement. In order to eliminate current de jure effects of the prior de jure system, the
historically black schools in two geographical proximate pairings (Southern University,
Baton Rouge and LSU, Baton Rouge; Southern University, New Orleans, University of
New Orleans), were provided the necessary financial support to move toward a higher
SREB classification. See Tenth Annual Evaluation, supra note 32, at i. Neither university
accomplished this goal within the ten-year period. Tenth Annual Evaluation, supra note
32, at 3. In the Grambling State University, Louisiana Tech University geographic
proximate pairing, Louisiana Tech was committed to changing its SREB status from
SREB Four Year III to II status and it reached its goal. Id. at 3; 1994 Louisiana Settlement
Agreement, supra note 177, at 3-5.
324. 1994 Louisiana Settlement Agreement, supra note 177, at 20-22.
325. See, e.g., Jessica Fender, College Decree Results Meager, THE ADVOCATE, Dec. 4,
2005, at Al, (commenting that "despite court-mandated scholarships, academic
programs and recruiting efforts, LSU and Southern University are about as black or
white as they were in 1995, when a review panel began tracking their progress.").
326. Tenth Annual Evaluation, supra note 32, at 43. In the Tenth Annual Evaluation,
the Monitoring Committee commented that "[m]ovement toward increasing the
diversity of employees continues to remain minimal." Id. A comparison of employees
demonstrates largely white employee staffs at historically white colleges and largely
black staffs at historically black colleges:
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V. Release from Federal Court Oversight: Availability of
Grutter Affirmative Action in Louisiana and Mississippi
The Settlement Agreement in United States v. Louisiana was
designed to remedy the vestiges of the state's dual system of higher
education by focusing specifically on its university admissions
standards, program duplication, and institutional mission
assignments. The Settlement Agreement in Ayers v. Musgrove
focused largely on incentives for the state's historically black
institutions to attract other races. The federal court in the
Mississippi case has released the state of Mississippi from oversight
and the parties in United States v. Louisiana look forward to a
Declaration of Unitary Status, which will signify closure to the
lawsuit and bring final assurance that there are no current effects of
past de jure segregation causally linked to the prior de jure system.
At the point of the Declaration of Unitary Status, the federal
court is no longer empowered to issue any orders continuing
remedial measures under the Agreement. 327 For example, under the
Louisiana Settlement Agreement, the federal court had the power to
order race-specific or race-conscious remedial measures to provide
other-race scholarships and to hire other-race staff, employees and
faculty, and such measures would have been wholly appropriate.
Unitary status, however, is antithetical to any arguments that
present effects of prior de jure discrimination exist. Race qua race

2004

1995
Institution

White

Black

Other

Grambling
La. Tech.
LSU A&M
LSU-S
UNO
ULL
McNeese
Southeastern
Nicholls
Northwestern
ULM
Southern A&M

74
895
4356
265
972
1100
579
905
587
564
992
105

966
203
1149
53
288
356
132
169
46
94
258
86

54
25
321
9
127
95
1
32
14
21
24
82

White

Black

Other

83
27
4327
287
1010
1154
576
1097
634
698
870
98

648
212
1225
60
348
407
150
185
86
103
203
1472

44
58
467
13
104
103
31
53
24
31
47
71

See Second Annual Evaluation, supra note 251, at Appendix G; Tenth Annual Evaluation,
supra note 32, at 43-44.
327. See Tenth Annual Evaluation, supra note 32, at I, 47.
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initiatives would most certainly be unconstitutional. 328 The only
constitutional use of race outside of a court-ordered desegregation
agreement would be its use in Grutter affirmative action
329
programs.
The United States Supreme Court has said that the attainment
of "diversity" in a university student body is laudable, that it can
serve as a compelling state interest.330 The Louisiana Monitors
spoke to this issue in their final conclusions and recommendations:
Diversity is important. We trust that all institutions adhere to the
admissions criteria framework outlined in the Master Plan
requiring that institutions have 15 percent of its entering class set
aside for admissions exceptions in compliance with the Settlement
Agreement and continue and to pay particular attention to the
more aggressive recruitment efforts with331respect to other-race
faculty, staff, administration and students.
However, in the state of Louisiana, the use of race-specific
student, faculty and employee initiatives post-Declaration of
Unitary Status also requires an analysis under Louisiana state
constitutional law. I predict that the next round of higher education
litigation in the state of Louisiana will include the cases that seek to
address a university's attempt to implement Grutter diversity
initiatives.
Under the Louisiana State Constitution of 1974, a Grutter
affirmative action program that considers race would raise serious
state constitutional questions. The Louisiana Constitution provides:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law
shall discriminate against a person because of race or religious
ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously,
or unreasonably discriminate against a person because of birth,
age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or
affiliations.332

This provision has been interpreted as exemplary of the concept that
"a state constitutional provision can.., be intended to afford and
construed as affording greater protection than its federal
328. See Regents v. Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S.265 (1978).
329. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-340 (2003). In Grutter, the Supreme Court
found the University of Michigan Law School's admissions program constitutional.

Using race as a one of many factors, the plan was narrowly tailored towards to
accomplishment of the compelling state interest of diversity. Id.
330. Id. at 328.
331. Tenth Annual Evaluation, supra note 32, at 46.
332. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3 (1974) (emphasis added).
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counterpart." 333 While the use of race as criteria in an affirmative
action program must withstand an evaluation under strict scrutiny
under the United States Constitution, 334 Article I Section 3 of the
Louisiana State Constitution provides that any use of race results in
a complete repudiation of the law. 335 If Louisiana Associated General
Contractors v. State of Louisiana is authoritative in the context of
higher education, for example, the Paul M. Hebert Law Center's
attempt to achieve diversity by using race as a factor in admission
would likely result in a finding that the admissions process is
constitutionally invalid. 336
Thus, now that the Settlement
Agreement has expired, African-American enrollment at the
flagship law school would be wholly dependent upon race-neutral
criteria in the admissions selection. 337
333. La. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. La., 669 So.2d 1185, 1196 (La. 1996).
334. Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (providing "all racial classifications,
imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a
reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such classifications are
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
governmental interests.").
335. La. Associated Gen. Contractors, 669 So.2d at 1196.
336. In La. Associated Gen. Contractors, the Louisiana Supreme Court found the
Louisiana Minority and Women's Business Enterprise Act unconstitutional. 669 So.2d at
1202. The Act contained a set-aside provision allowing a 10% set aside for minority
business enterprises and 2% for women's business enterprises with the concurrence of
the commissioner of administration.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1955 (1992).
Additionally, the Act required each agency to submit strategic plans of compliance and
if the agency failed to do so, the Division of Administration was empowered to
formulate a strategic plan of compliance for the Agency. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1956
(1992). Holding the Act unconstitutional, Justice K. Kimball wrote:
[Tihe act provides to members of certain designated races and excludes from
members of non-designated races the opportunity to bid on certain contracts
and the opportunity to match the lowest bid made by a non-minority bidder
and thereby obtain the contract on certain other projects. The set-asides and
preferences under the Act clearly discriminate against a person on the basis of
race, and the Act, to that extent, is unconstitutional under La. Const. Art. I, Sec.
3.
La. Associated Gen. Contractors, 669 So.2d at 1201.
337. Professor John Devlin of the Paul M. Hebert Law Center of Louisiana State
University has critiqued the state Supreme Court's interpretation of the State
Constitution's equality provision:
[Iln Louisiana... the prospect for robust independent state constitution based
'voice' in civil rights is poor. There is little organic tradition of constitutional
protection of civil rights in this state .... [T]he Louisiana Constitution as
interpreted in [Louisiana Associated General Contractors], not only provides no
truly independent contribution to debate over civil rights but also, I am sorry to
say, creates an additional obstacle to achievement of real world equality for
traditionally disfavored groups.
John Devlin, Louisiana Associated General Contractors: A Case Study in the Failure of a
State Equality Guarantee to Further the Transformative Vision of Civil Rights, 63 LA. L.
REV. 887,889 (2003).
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The viability of Grutter diversity initiatives in the state of
Mississippi, post-Settlement Agreement, is not so clear. The state of
Mississippi is one of thirty-five states of the nation whose state
338
constitutions do not contain an equal protection provision.
However, the non-existence of an express equal protection
constitutional text would not prevent a state from finding an
implied understanding of equal protection within another
constitutional text. Thus, most states have determined that some
source within the state's statutory law or constitution creates a right
to equal protection. 339 The state of Mississippi is one of two states
where this determination has not been made. 340 The Mississippi
State Supreme Court has not interpreted the state of Mississippi's
due process provision as containing an equal protection
component. 341
Therefore, the question of whether a Grutter
diversity program violates Mississippi law remains unanswered.

338. See MISS. CONST. art. 3, §§ 5-32. The state constitutions of California, Connecticut,
Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, Rhode Island and South Carolina contain equal protection
provisions similar to that contained within the United States Constitution; the remaining
states do not. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Evolution of Equality in State Constitutional Law,
34 RUTGERS L.J. 1013, 1055 n.292 (2003).
339. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954). Boiling was the companion case to
Brown v. Board of Education wherein the Supreme Court required the District of
Columbia public schools to desegregate and established that the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution contained an Equal Protection component:
[T]he concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The 'equal protection of
the laws' is a more explicit safeguard or prohibited unfairness than 'due
process of law,' and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always
interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may
be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.
Id. at 499.
340. Randal S. Jeffrey, Equal Protection in State Courts: The New Economic Equality
Rights, 17 LAW & INEQ. 239, 251 n.57 (1999) (asserting "Delaware and Mississippi are the
only two states whose courts have not held that their constitutions guarantee equal
protection.").
341. Id.
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VI. Epilogue: Justice Scalia's Prediction in United States v.
Fordice: Racial Identifiability, the Integrative Ideal and the
Limits of the Law
342
If you build it... they might not come!

Justice Antonin Scalia was the lone dissenter in United States v.
Fordice.343 His dissent has been largely ignored by scholars, possibly
because of the strength of the 8-1 opinion. Justice Clarence Thomas
suggested that there could be no serious debate respecting the
344
authoritativeness and appropriateness of the Court's decision.
However, Justice Scalia's opinion suggested that the Green standard,
as applied by the majority, was inappropriate in the higher
education context. 345 According to Justice Scalia:
Green... has no proper application in the context of higher
education, provides no genuine guidance to States and lower
courts, and is as likely to subvert as to promote the interests
of
346
those citizens on whose behalf the present suit was brought.
Justice Scalia speculated that the majority's application of Green
to the higher education context would result in various problems:
"[Y]ears of litigation-driven confusion and destabilization in the
university systems of all the formerly de jure States, that will benefit
neither blacks nor whites, neither predominantly black institutions
nor predominantly white ones." 347
Indeed, Justice Scalia pondered whether the application of
Green might, in fact, result in detriment to historically black
colleges. 348 His comment was both perceptive and insightful.
System-wide dismantlement poses a very real threat for both
historically black and white institutions. While historically black
institutions are thought to be the most vulnerable when program
342. See infra note 365.
343. See Fordice, 505 U.S. at 749 (Scalia, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Scalia agreed with the majority that states operating under a prior de jure system

of segregation in higher education were constitutionally required to "remove all
discriminatory barriers to its state-funded universities." Id. He also agreed that the
State of Mississippi was not constitutionally "compel[led]... to remedy funding
disparities between its historically black institutions (HBI's) and historically white
institutions (HWI's)." Id.
344. Id. at 749 (Thomas, J., concurring).

345. Id. at 749-750.
346. Id.

347. Id. at 762.
348. See id. at 760
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merger or closure is used to achieve Fordice dismantlement, the
elimination of a geographically proximate historically white
institution does not necessarily mean that a historically black
institution will attract the former's student constituency. 349 As
between the choice of the Bazemore standard and the Green standard
as announced in Fordice, Green would have been the only
constitutional route through which a true integrationist ideal could
be achieved. However, neither whites, nor African Americans want
integration, if integration means the loss of institutions either group
reveres. And if Justice White's words concerning "black enclaves by
private choice" from Fordice were anything, they were a signal to
those who represented the interests of historically black colleges in
both Mississippi and Louisiana that Fordice as a tool in the hands of
a federal court judge could be risky business for those who were
proponents of those interests. 350 The litigants in both cases sought
to avoid the unpredictability of a judicially drawn remedy.
Regarding the Mississippi case, Justice Scalia may have
correctly predicted the results of the desegregation lawsuit. Once
the case was remanded to the district court, another nine years
passed before the parties reached a settlement. 351 At the expiration
of the Louisiana Settlement Agreement, and approximately five
years into the funding provisions of Mississippi Settlement
Agreement, many of both states' universities are still substantially
identifiable by race. 352 Whether erasing the effects of de jure

349. See id. In the Tennessee desegregation case, the University of Tennessee campus
located in Nashville, Tennessee was geographically proximate to the historically black
Tennessee State University. As part of the judicially designed remedial plan for
desegregation, the court ordered the Nashville campus of University of Tennessee
merged into Tennessee State University. White students who had previously attended
University of Tennessee, Nashville, opted instead to drive many additional miles to
attend Middle Tennessee State University. See Geier v. Blanton, 427 F. Supp. 644, 652-53
(M.D. Tenn.1977); Geier v. Univ. of Tenn., 597 F.2d 1056, 1064 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated sub
nom., Geier v. Richardson, 881 F.2d 1075 (6th Cir. 1989). See also Matt Pulle, White Out:
The TSU Audits Didn't Focus on Another Problem: The School's Lack of White Kids,
NASHVILLE SCENE, May 6, 2004, where the author notes that although TSU was growing,
"white students flocked to MTSU," and Liz Murray Garrigan, Lightening Up, NASHVILLE
SCENE, Nov. 6, 1997, for a discussion on how TSU administration seem unable to stem
the tide of Nashville students who now drive to Middle Tennessee State University in
Murfreesboro.
350. See supra Part IV E; see Fordice supra note 265 and accompanying text.
351. See Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F.Supp 1419, 1428 (N.D. Miss. 1995), affd, 358 F.3d 356,
365 (5th Cir. 2004).
352. In Louisiana:

HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY LAW JOURNAL

2004

Institution
La Tech
LSU A&M
LSU-S
UNO
ULL
McNeese
Southeastern
Nicholls
Northwestern
ULM
Southern A&M

White
68.0%
80.9%
60.2%
51.0%
74.3%
74.0%
75.0%
68.8%
51.4%
74.3%
.3%

Black
15.7%
8.8%
30.9%
30.5%
19.1%
21.4%
18.9%
24.7%
37.7%
19.1%
96.5%

Other
16.2%
10.2%
8.9%
18.5%
6.6%
4.6%
6.1%
6.5%
10.9%
6.6%
3.3%

Tenth Annual Evaluation, supra note 32, at 14-16.In Mississippi:
Institution
Ethnicity
Fall 2003
Fall 2004
White
327
25
Alcorn
Black
2,955
3,080
State University
Other
0
2
Not Identified
0
0
White
2,445
2,333
Delta State University
Black
1,401
1,601
Other
56
47
Not Identified
0
0
White
342
291
Jackson
Black
7,310
7,756
State University
Other
54
72
Not Identified
0
0
White
12,124
11,921
Mississippi
Black
2,945
2,970
State University
Other
400
446
Not Identified
704
597
White
96
103
Mississippi
Black
3,353
3,415
Valley State University
Other
8
11
Not Identified
49
92
White
11,298
11,737
University
Black
1,822
1,917
of Mississippi
Other
319
364
Not identified
365
479
White
1,416
1,575
University
Black
196
266
of Mississippi Medical Other
161
162
Center
Not Identified
152
167
White
10,765
10,586
University of Southern Black
3,581
3,887
Mississippi
Other
552
613
Not Identified

152

167
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segregation or creating racial non-identifiability in higher education
under the Fordice formula was ever attainable is perhaps an
unanswerable question considering all the variables. The numbers
are most disparate at the historically black colleges and universities.
White students still do not readily choose to attend historically black
undergraduate universities in any significant numbers when
historically white alternatives are available. 353 That many of these
universities are still essentially racially identifiable suggests that
there may be limits to what higher education desegregation law
may achieve as a result of an agreement between the parties and
perhaps even at the hand of a federal court judge.
A study conducted in 2004 suggested several reasons why
Mississippi's historically black colleges and universities may not
experience the significant integration or desegregation sought in its
settlement agreement. 3 4 The report was based on the responses of
participants in several focus group studies from which white
student perceptions of historically black colleges and universities
were drawn. 35 5 The responses suggested that the populations
surveyed generally perceived the historically black college or
university negatively. They voiced concerns about institutional
quality, 356 academic credibility, 3 7 white minority status on

Bd. of Trustees Institutions of Higher Learning St. of Miss., AYERS ACCOUNTABILITY
MANUAL, Sept. 15, 2005. Although the effective date of the Mississippi Settlement
Agreement was October 18, 2004, after the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari, funding draws based on the Settlement Agreement began in 2002. See id.
353. The statistics are different at the only historically black professional school
within either the Louisiana or Mississippi system, suggesting that when educational
resources are scarce and therefore considered more valuable, white students will
compete for limited places and choose to attend historically black institutions. Southern
University Law Center is one of the most desegregated institutions within either the
Louisiana or Mississippi higher education systems. The Law Center has graduated a
total of 3056 students since it opened in 1947. Interview with Elaine Simmons, Registrar,
Southern University Law Center in Baton Rouge, La. (Jan. 22, 2007). Of these graduates,
1999 have been African American and 1057 have been white. Id. The first white law
student graduated from the Law Center in May, 1972. Id. However, the total white
student graduation statistic represents 34.5%of the Law Center's graduating population
and this has been attained within the last 34 years of the Law Center's existence. Id.
354. See Paul E. Sum, et al., Race, Reform, and Desegregation in Mississippi Higher
Education: Historically Black Institutions after United States v. Fordice, 29 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 403, 411-16 (2004) (discussing reasons such as perceived quality and academic
credibility; social discomfort and minority status; reverse discrimination; and parent and
peer pressure).
355. See id. at 414.
356. Id. at 416 (quoting a focus group participant, "predominantly black schools do
not have a reputation in the white community").
357. Id. at 417 (finding that "white high school and community college participants
generally felt that quality of education was low at the HBIs").
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historically black college campuses, 358 discriminatory treatment at
the hands of African-American students, 359 and finally, parental or
360
peer disapproval of the choice of an historically black college.
The writers commented that the exclusive remedial focus on the
historically black colleges might jeopardize the desegregation effort
if these attitudes hold true across time. 361
The results of the 2004 study also suggested the Fordice
settlement might be premised upon the incorrect assumption that
current African-American student choice of historically black
institutions is necessarily connected to the prior de jure
segregation; 362 that the responsibility for desegregation may be
unfairly and disproportionately borne by the historically black
colleges; 363 and that resultant failure to achieve projected settlement
other-race percentages may portend danger for Mississippi
historically black colleges in the future. 364 These observations may
not only be germane to the future of black colleges in Mississippi.
They may pose important questions about the future of the
historically black college in general, but only if historically black
institutions view themselves as passive actors, waiting for other-race
students to realize their presence, their value, and their importance
as a one of many actors in their state's diverse array of offerings of
colleges and universities.
If diversity in the student body is an important goal for the
historically black college, then the observations of the study can be
the foundations of another conversation. Perhaps the historically
black college can take the last breath of Fordiceas the moment within
which it re-conceptualizes, redefines, and moves itself forward. The
"Field of Dreams" approach for diversity enhancing initiatives at
historically black colleges under Fordice probably does not work and
the experiences of the historically black colleges under both
Agreements are probably evidence of this conclusion. 365 In the
358. Id. at 419 (quoting focus group participant who described friend's experience of
attending historically black institution, "[h]e said he was like the only white person
there, and he felt so stupid").
359. See id. at 422-23 (describing general sentiment among focus group participants
were that white students would not be welcomed by black students at historically black
colleges).
360. See id. at 424-25 (quoting focus group participant, "I don't have a problem with
black people, but the people I'm around do.").
361. See id. at 433.
362. See id. at 429.
363. See id. at 430-431.
364. See Id. at 432-433.
365. The 1989 movie, Field of Dreams opens with Ray Kinsella's dream voice telling
him that if he builds a baseball diamond in his cornfield, the Chicago Black Sox team,
and more specifically, the much maligned Shoeless Joe Jackson, will come and play: "If
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twenty-first century, where Fordice is ending, and Grutter diversity
work may begin, the efforts of Alcorn State University under the
Mississippi Settlement Agreement may demonstrate how the
mandatory requirements under Fordice might inform promising
future Grutterwork.
Alcorn State University is the only historically black university
in the state of Mississippi which has successfully met the three year
attainment of ten-percent other-race student enrollment, thereby
entitling it to receive its pro-rata share of the principal existing
under the public endowment pursuant to the Agreement. 366 It was
able to accomplish this goal through aggressive marketing and
recruitment. 367 However, Alcorn State University did not conceive
of its other-race recruitment goal as narrowly as the parties to the
agreement may have intended. It did not target the same pool of
students as had those who conducted the focus group and who
seemed to be so negatively predisposed to the idea of attending a
historically black college. Its other-race students are not only from
the state of Mississippi, they also hail from Australia, Canada, and
Russia. As the university converts its Fordice work into a diversity
project, it moves towards a future where its recruiters also plan to
seek out more Hispanic students. 368 Alcorn's creative approach to
its desegregation work reflects an ultimate truth in the words of the
Louisiana Monitors as they closed the Tenth Interim Report to Judge
Kurt Englehardt:
[A] Desegregation Settlement Agreement is just another step in
the long process of achieving a more just and equitable society. Its
effects, and the very substantial financial commitments made by
[a state] will prove beneficial only if the behavior that has been
engendered during the [agreement] becomes the normative
you build it... he will come." FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal Pictures 1989).
366. Mississippi Settlement Agreement, supra note 34, at 10.
367. See Alcorn State's Benefits from Ayers Fund Begin: Alcorn State University, Dining
Hall Construction, 22 DIVERSE ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUc. 20, 20, Dec. 15, 2005 (stating
Alcorn State successfully reached its 10% other-race student goal); see also Historically
Black Alcorn State Univ. Takes Pride in its Growing 'Minority' Enrollment, JOHNSON PUB.
Co., at 22, Apr. 28, 2003 (recruiting international students actively had strong positive
effect on meeting desegregation goals).
368. See Kay Mills, A Mixed Blessing?: Critics Object to Mississippi's Settlement of a 1975
Anti-Segregation Lawsuit Involving the State's 'Historically Black Universities', NAT'L
CROSSTALK, Summer 2004, at 8, available at http://www.highereducation.org/crosstalk
(follow "Back Issues" hyperlink; then follow "Summer 2004" hyperlink); Sara Hebel,
Alcorn State Meets Nonblack Enrollment Goal Under Desegregation Settlement, THE CHRON.
OF HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 25, 2005, at A33; see also Alcorn State University Five-Year
Strategic Plan FY 2008 Through 2012, submitted to: St. of Miss. Bd. Of Tr. of State Inst. of
Higher Learning, submitted By: Dr. Clinton Bristow, Jr., President Alcorn State
University, Alcorn State, Mississippi 39096-7500, Aug. 1, 2006, at 2-3.
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behavior for all those responsible for higher education in [the
state]. 369
But the Monitors' statement may be informed by a fear that
fifty-three years after Brown, the lack of substantial change in the
college racial profiles in many universities in Mississippi and
Louisiana might mean that it is impossible to achieve and maintain
real integration in the state's institutions of higher learning. Their
statement contains sentiments of both hope and doubt. The
Monitors hope that the state and its citizens understand that a truly
desegregated higher education system, one that is representative of
equality of opportunity, is a reflection of the success the project of
integration has had in the society of its locus. Their doubts about
the normalization of integrative behavior are grounded in the
stormy realities witnessed by all of us post-Katrina. The fear is a
real one and it is centered on the failures of the interests of the
citizenry to converge outside the negative influences of race and
class.

369. Tenth Annual Evaluation, supra note 32, at 47.

